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Wigdor: Fourth Amendment

WHAT'S IN A WORD ? A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE I, § 12 OF THE NEW
YORK STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AS INTERPRETED BY
THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS AND
TILE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Douglas Holden Wigdor

INTRODUCTION
Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution provides that:
The right of the People to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
These fifty-four words of the New York State Constitution are
identical to the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment.2
* Douglas Holden Wigdor is currently an Assistant District Attorney in
Suffolk County, New York. He is assigned to the complex litigation/whitecollar crime bureau. Mr. Wigdor received an A.B. from Washington
University, St. Louis, Missouri, Cum Laude, 1990; a J.D. from Catholic
University in 1993; and a Masters Degree in Politics from Oxford University,
England in 1995. The views expressed herein are the author's and not
necessarily those of the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office.
N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 12.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This provision states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,

757

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1998], Art. 10

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

However, during the last two decades there has been an
unprecedented divergence in the interpretation of those words by
the New York Court of Appeals and by the United States Supreme

Court. Although a state is free as a matter of its own state
constitutional law to restrict police activity to a greater degree than
the federal courts,3 the preferred practice is one of uniformity

where the constitutional language is identical. Despite the identical
language between the first paragraph of Article I, § 12 of the New

York State Constitution and the United States Constitution's Fourth
Amendment, the New York Court of Appeals has disregarded the
logic and analysis of the United States Supreme Court's

interpretation of this area of criminal procedure.

Basing its

decisions on "independent state grounds," the New York Court of
Appeals has granted broader individual rights than those mandated
by the Supreme Court. This has restricted law enforcement
techniques, investigations, and the prosecution of criminal
defendants.
In many criminal prosecutions involving search and seizure
issues, the New York Court of Appeals has broadened the scope of
conduct that constitutes an impermissible search or seizure by the
United States Supreme Court holding that the New York State
Constitution affords its citizens greater rights than the Federal
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Id.
' See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). In Hess, the Court stated
that:
[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater
restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to
be necessary upon federal constitutional standards ....
But, of course, a State may not impose such greater
restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this
Court specifically refrains from imposing them.
Id.; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) ("Our holding, of course,
does not affect the States power to impose higher standards on searches and
seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.");
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1988) ("New York is, of course, free
to develop its own law of search and seizure to meet the needs of local law
enforcement.").
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Constitution. Thus, a New York police officer who obeys the
mandates of the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment,
may still be in violation of the New York State Constitution. As a
result, numerous successful prosecutions for murder, drug sales,
rape, and other felonies have been reversed by the highest court in
New York as well as lower appellate courts following the Court of
Appeals' precedent. It has been argued that in relation to the total
number of criminal prosecutions, few criminal convictions are
actually overturned by the New York appellate courts'
interpretation of Article I, § 12. However, the decisions by the
Court of Appeals in interpreting Article I, § 12 have a dramatic
impact on all citizens of the State of New York.
A number of cases involving potential search and seizure issues
have been hindered or curtailed prior to a criminal trial. In
addition, numerous cases are plea bargained to lesser crimes and
The threat of a judge
dramatically reduced sentences.
suppressing incriminating evidence has meant that otherwise
strong criminal prosecutions have been pled. As a direct result of
the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Article I, § 12, New York
police under the guidance of county prosecutors, have limited
their investigatory techniques in the fear that incriminating
evidence may be suppressed at a later point in time. New York
prosecutors are often left to explain to the police that while a
search warrant for a particular investigatory technique would be
permitted by the federal government, the laws in New York do
not permit such investigations. Thus, many instances of criminal
conduct go undetected while the gathering of incriminating
evidence becomes more difficult.
The practical effect of these facts can not be precisely
ascertained. One fact, however, is certain, New York prosecutors
and New York police officers operate under a different set of rules
than federal and state law enforcement agents that follow the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution's
Fourth Amendment. In response to concern by law abiding citizens
of New York, (that the Court of Appeals has actually restricted
their individual rights by undermining the effectiveness of law

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1998], Art. 10

760

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 14

enforcement and criminal prosecution), the New York State Senate4
and Assembly 5 have proposed legislation that would mandate that
Article I, § 12 and the Fourth Amendment be analyzed coextensively. This pending legislation would prohibit the New York
Court of Appeals from granting greater rights to citizens of New
York based upon an independent state grounds analysis of Article I,

§ 12.
This article examines the divergence between the New York
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in their respective analysis
of Article 1, § 12 of the New York State Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically,
this article provides an extensive comparative analysis of each area
of search and seizure law where the New York Court of Appeals
has decided, based upon independent state grounds, to grant citizens
of New York greater rights than the Supreme Court. Each section
of this article reviews the differences between the federal and New
York standards. This article does not provide an analytical
interpretation of "independent state constitutionalism," or its
underlying rationale and principles; nor does this article provide a
historical account of the New York State Constitution.6
The primary goal of this article is to pragmatically analyze the
repercussions associated with the New York Court of Appeals'
position of granting greater constitutional search and seizure
protection than that of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Thus, this article focuses on the practical
ramifications confronted daily by law enforcement officers and
prosecutors in New York due to the Court of Appeals' decision to
grant extended rights beyond those already delineated by the United
States Supreme Court.

4 See S. 219-6041, 2d Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1996); S. 219-7041, 2d Legis.
Sess. (N.Y. 1996); S. 219-7146, 2d Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1996); S. 220-1584,
Annual Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
' See A. 219-9195, 2d Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1996); A. 219-9258, 2d Legis.
Sess. (N.Y. 1996); A. 220-642, Annual Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
6 See Robert M.
Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure
Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled
Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1996).
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Part I of this article discusses what constitutes a search and
seizure.7 It will become evident that the New York Court of
Appeals has interpreted Article I, § 12 broader than the Supreme
Court in its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
numerous police tactics which the Supreme Court has held do not
constitute a search and seizure, in fact do constitute a search and
seizure in the State of New York. Part II of this article next
considers probable cause under both the federal and state
Since 1983, the Supreme Court has examined
standards8
applications for search warrants based upon informants under the
totality of the circumstances test. In contrast, New York has
adhered to a more rigid standard which requires the search warrant
to expressly state the basis of knowledge and the veracity of the
informant. Part III of this article then examines the interaction
between the First and Fourth Amendments. 9 It illustrates how
search warrants for presumptively protected First Amendment
material require a higher level of probable cause in New York than
in the federal system. Part IV of this article reviews the area of
This area of the law
automobile searches and seizures.' 0
of
the Court of Appeals as
analysis
demonstrates the hypertechnical
compared with the Supreme Court's cohesive frame-work. Part V
and Part VI of this article scrutinize the divergence in analysis
between the New York Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
the searches of homes and businesses." These sections demonstrate
the difficulties law enforcement officers and prosecutors confront
when attempting to search a suspect's home or a closely regulated
business such as an automotive junkyard. Finally, Part VII
examines the exclusionary rule and the "good-faith" exception and
demonstrates how the New York Court of Appeals has refused to
adopt this exception. The Court of Appeals believes that this
exception would infringe upon the rights of New York citizens even
though it presumes that the officer's conduct could not have been
See infra notes 13-167 and accompanying text.
168-197 and accompanying text.
9See infra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
10See infra notes 214-262 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 263-343 and accompanying text.
7

8 See infra notes
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deterred. 12 Each section expresses the practical effect of New
York's highest court's views on daily law enforcement and criminal
prosecution. It appears that the New York Court of Appeals has
disregarded the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, thus resulting in diminished law enforcement
capabilities and reduced effectiveness in successful criminal
prosecutions.
I. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SEARCH AND SEIZURE?
The New York Court of Appeals has deviated from the standard
used by the Supreme Court in determining whether a search and
seizure has occurred and whether certain searches and seizures are
reasonable. The Court of Appeals' interpretation of Article I, §12
of the New York State Constitution has restricted law enforcement
techniques that have been held constitutional by the Supreme Court
under the premise that the New York State Constitution affords
greater rights to criminals than does the Fourth Amendment. This
section analyzes five Supreme Court cases involving the Court's
determination of what constitutes a search and seizure, and
furthermore, what constitutes a "reasonable" search and seizure.
With five separate Supreme Court cases as precedent, United States
v. Place,3 Oliver v. United States, 4 Floridav. Bostick,15 California
v. HodariD.,' 6 and Minnesota v. Dickerson,17 the New York Court
of Appeals restricted law enforcement techniques and disregarded
Supreme Court analysis citing independent state grounds.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. " " Although the New York
Constitution uses identical language to that of the Fourth
Amendment, what constitutes a search and seizure under the Fourth
"2See infra notes 344-379 and accompanying text.
13 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
14 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
502 U.S. 429 (1991).
499 U.S. 621 (1991).
17 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
"

16

18U.S. CONST.

amend. IV.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/10

6

1998

Wigdor: Fourth Amendment

FOURTHAMENDMENT

763

Amendment to the United States Constitution is very different from
what constitutes a search and seizure under Article I, § 12 of the
New York State Constitution. The New York Court of Appeals has
dramatically diverged from the recognized principles enunciated
and followed in the United States Supreme Court and other federal
courts. The words "search" and "seizure" are terms of limitation.
Thus, in order for the Fourth Amendment to be triggered, the
evidence that is obtained must have been the result of a search or
seizure. If the evidence obtained was the result of a search or

seizure, the Fourth Amendment requires that such search or seizure
be "reasonable."
For many years the Supreme Court held that a Fourth
Amendment search only occurred when there was a physical
intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area.", 9 These areas are
enumerated2 in the Fourth Amendment itself: "persons, " 'a
"papers," 1 and "effects. "2 What constitutes a search, however,
changed with the decision in Katz v. United States.2 In Katz,
F.B.I. agents overheard Katz's telephone conversations by attaching
an electronic listening and recording device to the exterior of a
public telephone booth. The Court rejected characterizing the issue
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961) (holding that a Fourth
Amendment seizure occurred when police officers placed "a microphone with a
spike about a foot long together with an amplifier, a power pack, and earphones"
inside petitioner's heating system). The Court found that a heating system "[w]as
an integral part of the premises occupied by the petitioners.. .[and the listening
device was placed in the system] without their knowledge and without their
consent." Id. at 511.
' See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("Compulsory
administration of a blood test does not implicate the Fifth Amendment, it plainly
involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment... [s]uch testing procedures plainly constitute searches of
'persons.'").
2" See also Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 735 (1877) (" lDetters, or sealed
packages subject to letter postage, without warrant, [cannot be opened and
examined].").
I See also Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964) (wherein
officers found "caps, women's stockings (one with mouth and eye holes), rope,
pillow slips, an illegally manufactured license plate equipped to be snapped over
another plate, and other items.").
19

23

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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as "whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected
area." 24 The Court concluded that when the government heard and
recorded Katz's words, they violated his privacy. The Court held
that Katz had a justifiable expectation of privacy when he used the
public telephone booth. Furthermore, society would recognize such
Therefore, the government's
an expectation as reasonable.
activities constituted an unreasonable search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. Justice Harlan in his concurrence said that
the defendant must have "exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy," and that expectation must be one "that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'." 5
Since Katz, it has been the law that the "[c]apacity to claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ...upon whether the

person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.", 26 A
subjective expectation of privacy has been found to be legitimate if
it is "one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 27
The Court has held that searches and seizures "[c]onducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions. "28 One such exception was recognized in Terry v.
Ohio,29 which held that " [w]here a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot" the officer may
briefly stop the suspicious person and make "reasonable inquiries"
aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions.3"
24 Id.
25 Id.

at 349.

at 361.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
21 Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984) (per curiam, quoting
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).
29 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
1 Id. at 30. See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In Adams,
the Court relied on the principle set forth in Terry that a police officer may
conduct a weapons search when an officer is justified in believing that the
26
27

individual is armed and dangerous. Id. at 145-46.
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Teny recognized a "narrowly drawn" exception to the probable
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment for certain seizures of
the person that do not rise to the level of a full arrest. Therefore,
although a Terry stop is a seizure, it does not require probable
cause. Where the intrusion on the individual is minimal, and when
law enforcement interests outweigh the privacy interests infringed
in a Teny encounter, a stop based on an objectively reasonable
suspicion, rather than upon probable cause, is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.
In Teny, the Court adopted a dual inquiry for evaluating the
reasonableness of an investigative stop. Under this approach, the
Court examines "whether the officer's action were justified at its
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.""'
The Court's opinion stated that "[o]bviously, not all personal
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves seizures of
persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a seizure has occurred." 32 In United
States v. Mendenhall,33 the Court adopted a test to assess whether
an individual has been seized. "[A] person has been 'seized' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave."3 The Court has held,
for example, that the "threatening presence of several officers, the
display of weapons, and uniformed attire" constitute an intimidating
show of authority triggering Fourth Amendment analysis.
In United States v. Place,5 the Supreme Court was confronted
with the issue of whether the temporary detention of luggage for
exposure to a trained narcotics detection dog, on the basis of
reasonable suspicion, was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
While awaiting a ticket at the Miami International Airport for a trip
31 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
32 Id.

at 19 n.16.

33 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
4Id.

at 554.

35 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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to New York, Raymond Place "aroused the suspicion of law
enforcement officers.",3 6 Walking to the gate, Place was stopped by
law enforcement agents and was asked to show identification.
Additionally, Place was asked whether his two suitcases could be
checked. While Place agreed, the agents chose not to search the
luggage as the plane was about to depart. Place remarked that "he
had recognized that [the agents] were police." 37 As a result, the
agents looked at the address tags on the luggage and noticed that
they had two separate addresses. The agents later discovered that
neither address existed and that the phone number Place gave to the
ticketing agent belonged to a different address located on the
identical street. Based upon these observations, the agents notified
the Drug Enforcement Administration [hereinafter "DEA"] in New
York. Once at LaGuardia Airport in New York, Place was
approached by DEA agents. Again, Place told the agents that "he
knew they were cops and had spotted them as soon as he had
deplaned., 38 The agents informed Place that they believed he may
be a drug smuggler. Place responded that his bags had already
been searched in Miami. Place refused to consent to the agents
request to search his luggage. Thereafter, one of the agents told
Place that they were going to take the luggage in order to obtain a
warrant, and that he could come with them. Place refused.
Approximately one and a half hours later, the agents arrived at
Kennedy Airport where a trained narcotics detection dog gave a
positive reaction to one of the two bags. As it was late on a Friday
afternoon, the agents kept the luggage over the weekend, and on
Monday morning, they secured a search warrant. The resulting
search discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine.
After being indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to sell,
Place moved to suppress the contraband, claiming that the
warrantless seizure of the luggage violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. The District Court held that Place's Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated. 39 The United States Court of Appeals for
36 Id.
at 698.

37 Id.
38Id.

31 United States v. Place, 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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the Second Circuit reversed holding that Terry "justiftied] a
warrantless seizure of [the] baggage on less than probable cause and
that reasonable suspicion [did] justify the investigatory stop of
Place... [but] that the prolonged seizure of Place's baggage
exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative
stop ....4o
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and Justice O'Connor,
writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding
that:
[G]iven the enforcement problems associated with the
detection of narcotics trafficking and the minimal intrusion
that a properly limited detention would entail, we conclude
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit such a
detention. On the facts of this case, however, we hold that
the police conduct exceeded the bounds of a permissible
investigative detention of the luggage. 4'
Although the Court ruled that the specifics of this fact scenario
were unreasonable given the length of the delay before subjecting
the luggage to a canine sniff test, the decision is clearly favorable to
law enforcement agents in that the Court held that Terry permits42 the
brief detention of luggage based upon less than probable cause.
The Court's analysis was based upon the proposition that when an
individual's luggage is seized under the Fourth Amendment, with
less than probable cause, a search cannot take place. The Court
stated that "[i]f this investigative procedure is itself a search
requiring probable cause, the initial seizure of respondent's luggage
40

Place, 462 U.S. at 700.

See United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44

(E.D.N.Y.1981).
41 Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
421 d. at 706. The Court concluded that
[W]hen an officer's observations lead him reasonably to
believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains
narcotics, the principles of Terry and its progeny would
permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate
the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that
the investigative detention is properly limited in scope.
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for the purpose of subjecting it to the sniff test-no matter how
' 43

brief-could not be justified on less than probable cause. ,
Therefore, since the Court had previously held that a person has a
protected privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment in their

personal luggage, 44 the Court concluded that a canine sniff is not
considered a search45 "within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." 4 6 If the Court had concluded that a canine sniff were

a search, it would logically follow, based upon Court precedent,
that probable cause would be necessary to "search."
The Court's rationale in determining that a canine sniff was not a
search was based upon the premise that it is sui generis. In other

words, a canine sniff does not infringe upon an individual's right to
privacy. A canine sniff does not require the luggage to be opened
and it only detects the presence of narcotics. Justice O'Connor
stated that, "despite the facts that the sniff tells the authorities
something about the contents of the luggage, the information
obtained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the

owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive

" Id. at 706 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967); United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421 (1981); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 881-82 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
"See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1976).
In this case, important Fourth Amendment privacy interests
were at stake. By placing personal effects inside a doublelocked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that
from public
the contents
would remain free
examination... [t]here being no exigency, it was
unreasonable for the government to conduct this search
without the safeguards a judicial warrant provides.
Id.
4Place,462 U.S. at 707. The Court stated:
A 'canine sniff ... does not require opening the
luggage.., does not expose non-contraband items that
otherwise would remain hidden from public view... [t]hus
the manner in which information is obtained ... is much less
intrusive than a typical search.
Id.
46 Id.
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investigative methods." 47 The Court's finding that a canine sniff is
not a search is essential in concluding that a seizure of luggage
based upon reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, followed by a
canine sniff, is not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Any
other finding would require law enforcement officials to obtain
probable cause to search before submitting the luggage to a trained
Additionally, the Court's ruling assists law
canine sniff.
enforcement where no reasonable suspicion or probable cause is
attainable and where a trained canine detects the presence of
contraband. Since a canine sniff is not considered by the Supreme
Court to be a search, unless a seizure takes place, neither
reasonable suspicion nor probable cause is necessary.
The New York Court of Appeals, in People v.Dunn,48 refused to
follow the Supreme Court's finding that a trained canine sniff is not
a search. In Dunn, the police seized large quantities of cocaine and
marijuana from Dunn's apartment after obtaining a search warrant
based upon a positive canine sniff. After learning that controlled
substances were being kept by Dunn in his apartment, the police
obtained a trained canine and went to the common hallway outside
Dunn's apartment. The dog reacted positively, and a search
warrant was obtained. The only issue for the Court of Appeals was
whether the evidence should be suppressed on the basis that the
canine sniff violated Dunn's constitutional rights.
The court acknowledged that Dunn's Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated, "in light of the rational adopted by the Supreme
Court in Place."4 9 The court, however, analyzed whether under

Art. I, § 12, "[o]ur State Constitution provides greater
protection." 5" The court justified their departure from the Supreme
Court in one paragraph, stating that:
[T]his Court has not hesitated to interpret article I, § 12
independently of its Federal counterpart when the analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court in a given area has
threatened to undercut the right of our citizens to be free
47

Place, 462 U.S. at 707.

48 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990).
49 Id.

at 23, 564 N.E.2d at 1056, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
50 Id. at 24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
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from unreasonable government intrusions. Because we
conclude that
the Place analysis does just that, we decline
51
it.
to follow
Thus, despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment and Article I,
§ 12 of the New York Constitution are worded identically, the
Court of Appeals, without any historical analysis as to why the
New York Constitution afforded these "greater" rights, decided not
to follow the Supreme Court's decision in Place. The Court did,
however, rely on scare tactics to conjure the image of state police
searching everywhere and everything with trained dogs. Judge
Titone stated that the divergence from the Supreme Court's opinion
was necessary; "to hold otherwise, we believe would raise the
specter of the police roaming indiscriminately through the corridors
of public housing projects with trained dogs in search of
drugs... [s]uch an Orwellian notion would be repugnant under
our State Constitution., 52 Judge Titone's argument, however, was
surely not presented in the fact scenario in Dunn. Law enforcement
officers went to Dunn's apartment only after learning that
contraband was in the apartment.5 3 The practical effect of the
decision in Dunn cannot be understated. Dunn now requires law
enforcement officers to now have a founded suspicion before a
proper canine sniff can be conducted. By holding that a canine
sniff is a search, the Court of Appeals has made it more difficult for
law enforcement officers to combat, for example, drugtrafficking.
" Id. (citations omitted).
52 Id.

at 25-26, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (citations omitted).
at 25-27, 564 N.E.2d at 1058-59, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392-93. Although
the New York Court of Appeals found that the canine sniff is a "search,"
contrary to the Supreme Court's analysis, the court did not suppress the
evidence in Dunn. The Court of Appeals created a new standard for search
scenarios involving canines. It held that although a canine sniff is a search,
only reasonable suspicion is necessary for such a search to take place. This
new standard is inapposite of the long history of rulings by the Supreme Court
which require probable cause when making a search.
Instead of
acknowledging that a canine sniff is not a search, the Court of Appeals held
that a lesser standard is necessary for such a search to take place. Practically
speaking, however, this standard will prove difficult for law enforcement
officials.
13 Id.
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Additionally, at a time when "home-made" explosives are being
transported and sold underground and where toxic chemicals are
being secreted in an effort to prevent detection, New York's highest
court has limited a useful ally in the detection of these potentially
harmful substances.
In Oliver v. United States,54 the Court attempted to clarify the
"open fields" doctrine. In 1924, the Court, by Justice Holmes in
Hester v. United States,55 held that it is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment for a law enforcement official to search a field vithout
a search warrant or probable cause. In Oliver, two Kentucky State
officers went to Oliver's home on a tip that he was farming
marijuana.56 Although, Oliver's farm had a locked gate with a "No
Trespassing" sign, the officers walked around the gate along the
road, and into the farm where they found a field of marijuana.57
Oliver was indicted and a suppression hearing was granted by the
District Court. The District Court, relying on Katz, 8 held that the
evidence was the result of an illegal search because Oliver had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his farm. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the District
Court, holding that an individual does not have a Fourth
Amendment privacy interest in "open fields," despite the Court's
holding in Katz. 59
Similarly, in State v. Thoniton,6' two police officers acted on a
tip that Thornton was growing marijuana. They went to the woods
behind his home and saw a "No Trespassing" sign. They then
walked along a path between his home and a neighboring home,
until they reached a chicken wire fence enclosing a field of
marijuana. 6 ' Based upon their observations, a search warrant was
secured, and Thornton was arrested and indicted. The trial court
suppressed the incriminating evidence and held the "open fields"
466 U.S. 170 (1984).

55 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
56 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173.
57Id.

11
See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
59 United
States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1982).
S453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1984).
61Oliver, 466 U.S. at 174.
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doctrine inapplicable, on the theory that Thornton had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his fenced field.62 The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court upheld the trial court's decision, 63 finding that the
police were not lawfully present on Thornton's property, thus
holding the "open fields" doctrine inapplicable.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases 64 to clarify
the Court's opinion in Hester in light of the Court's more recent
decisions in Katz and its progeny. Justice Powell, writing for the
Court's 6-3 majority, held that in both cases the warrantless
searches of the fields were constitutional under the "open fields"
doctrine. The Court based its decision on the premise that an
individual cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
"activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area
immediately surrounding the home." 65 The Court was of the
opinion that society was not prepared to recognize a privacy interest
in activities that occur in the open fields, even where signs are
posted and fences are erected.
In People v. Scott, 66 the Court of Appeals was confronted with a
fact scenario similar to that in Oliver, but reached a different
conclusion. In Scott, a search warrant and eventual conviction was
secured based upon observations made of the defendant's "open
fields."67 Scott's 165 acres of fields and woods were surrounded
by "No Trespassing" signs.' However, a private citizen, who had
62 Id.
at

175.
63 Thornton, 453 A.2d 489.
1 United States v.Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 459
U.S. 1168 (1983); Maine v.Thornton, 453 A.2d 489 (1984), cert. granted,
460 U.S. 1068 (1983).
65 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
6 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992), consolidated
on appeal with People v. Keta. The Court of Appeals consolidated two cases
in one opinion. The other case, People v. Keta, infra notes 332-335 and
accompanying text, analyzed the constitutionality of administrative inspection
of the vehicle dismantling business.
67 Id. at 479, 593 N.E.2d at 1331, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 923. Scott's residence
consisted of a mobile home with no utilities. Additionally, the marijuana that
was eventually located was 300-400 yards away from the curtilage of the
home.
68Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 478, 593 N.E.2d at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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shot and followed a deer onto Scott's property, observed what he
believed to be marijuana. Approximately one year later, the private
citizen again entered the property and noticed the remnants of
marijuana. Thereafter, he notified the police who requested that he
take a sample from one of the plants located on the property. The
local citizen complied, and two police officers went to Scott's
property and confirmed the citizen's observation.6 9 The trial court
denied the defendant's motion to suppress, relying on the rationale
established by the Supreme Court in Oliver. The Appellate
Division affirmed, embracing the decision in Oliver and holding
that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in an
"uncultivated field away from the curtilage of any residential
structure .... .70
The Court of Appeals in reversing the Appellate Division refused
to adopt the standard in Oliver and held that the "Oliver majority's
literal interpretation of the [Fourth] Amendment's language and its
reliance on history to support it, [is of] little relevance ...
The Court of Appeals, per Judge Hancock, stated that, "[w]e
believe that under the law of this State the citizens are entitled to
more protection. A constitutional rule which permits State agents
to invade private lands for no reason at all-without permission and
in outright disregard of the owner's efforts to maintain privacy by
fencing or posting signs-is one that we cannot accept as adequately
preserving fundamental rights of New York citizens."' Thus, the
Court of Appeals held, based upon independent state constitutional
grounds, that when an individual posts a "No Trespassing" sign
around hundreds of acres of forest, woodland, or farm land, the
"expectation that [his] privacy rights will be respected and that [he]
will be free from unwanted intrusions is reasonable."3
By
broadening the constitutionally protected area around the home, the
New York Court of Appeals has limited the ability of police to
69 Id.
at

479, 593 N.E.2d at 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
v. Scott, 169 A.D.2d 1023, 1025, 565 N.Y.S.2d 576, 577 (3d
Dep't 1991).
71Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
n Id.
o People

73 Id. at

491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
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conduct non-warrant surveillance of large woodlands and farms
where ongoing criminal activity may be suspected. In addition to
the obvious effects of the Scott decision on the drug production
business, the detection of environmental crimes will undoubtedly be
curtailed due to the difficulty associated with obtaining a warrant to
search for hazardous waste sites secreted in "open fields."
The question of whether a police encounter with an individual
rises to the level of a "seizure" is an important issue for law
enforcement officials who are conducting investigations. If a
brief detention amounts to a seizure, the Fourth Amendment's
proscriptions are triggered, and reasonable suspicion is necessary.
Otherwise, any evidence obtained as a result of the seizure is
likely to be suppressed. The Supreme Court and the New York
Court of Appeals have diverged on the issue of what type of
police conduct amounts to a seizure of an individual. In three
separate cases, the Supreme Court has expanded the techniques of
law enforcement officials in investigatory stops to combat the
problems associated with narcotics and weapons. The Court of
Appeals, however, has refused to follow the guidance of the
Supreme Court, and has declined to adopt such measures.
In Florida v. Bostick,74 for example, the Supreme Court was
confronted with a customary practice of Florida Law enforcement
officers in which they were allowed to board any bus, without
articulable suspicion, ask passengers for their ticket and
identification, and request consent to a search of their personal
belongings. In Bostick, two officers boarded a bus in Fort
Lauderdale that was in transit from Miami to Atlanta.75

The

officers were in full uniform and were carrying their guns in a ziplock pouch. The officers admittedly had no probable cause or
reasonable suspicion when they boarded the bus; however, once on
the bus, they asked Bostick for his identification and his ticket.76
The ticket and identification matched, but the officers told Bostick
that they were narcotics agents looking for illegal drugs, and

74 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
71 Id. at 431.
76 id.
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requested consent to search his luggage." Although the officers
informed Bostick that he had the right to refuse to consent,
Bostick consented and cocaine was found.
Bostick was charged with drug trafficking and moved to suppress
the contraband on the ground that it had been seized in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights, in that, the officers seized him
without any reasonable suspicion. 9 The trial court denied the
motion, and Bostick pleaded guilty while reserving the right to
appeal the denial of the suppression motion. Bostick appealed and
the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bostick was
"seized" since a reasonable passenger would not have felt free to
leave the bus to avoid questioning by the officers.t0 The Florida
Supreme Court categorically ruled that, "[a]n impermissible seizure
result[s] when police mount a drug search on buses during
scheduled stops and question boarded passengers without articulable
reasons for doing so, thereby obtaining consent to search the
passengers' luggage." 8 ' The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorariP to determine whether Florida's decision, that such
conduct is per se unconstitutional, is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment's standards on investigatory stops.
The Court, in a 6-3 decision authored by Justice O'Connor,
analyzed the issue in light of similar investigatory stops conducted
by law enforcement officials that do not amount to a seizure. The
Court stated that:
[O]ur cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur
simply because a police officer approaches an individual
and asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person
would feel free to disregard the police and go about his
business... the encounter is consensual and no reasonable
suspicion is required. The encounter will not trigger

'nId.at 432.
78

id.

79 id.

I Id. at 433. See Bostick v. Florida, 554 So.2d 1153 (1989).

81 Bostick, 554 So.2d at 1154.

1 Florida v. Bostick, 498 U.S. 894 (1990).
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Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it losses its consensual
nature. 3
Twenty-two years earlier, the Terry"I case discussed the issue
raised by Justice O'Connor. In Terry, the Court stated that
"[o]bviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure'
85
has occurred."
The Court's analysis, however, differed from the typical Terry
scenario which presents the issue of whether a reasonable person
would feel "free to leave." The Court relied upon their decision in
Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Delgado,s6 where it was
acknowledged that the factory workers in question may not have
been free to leave work when the INS agents arrived. The Court in
Delgado surmised that no seizure occurred because there was no
"reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful
answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to
answer." 7 In Bostick, Justice O'Connor held that the "free to
leave" standard was inapplicable in the bus scenario since Bostick's
confinement "was the natural result of his decision to take the
bus." 88 The Court held that the proper standard when examining
this type of scenario is "whether a reasonable person would feel
free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter." 8 9
Although the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine
whether Bostick was seized under the guideline as set forth in its
decision, the Court did, however, reject Bostick's argument "[t]hat
he must have been seized because no reasonable person would
83

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.

84See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text
85 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).

for a discussion of Terry.

466 U.S. 210 (1984) (wherein INS agents regularly visited factories at
random
and questioned employees with regards to their citizenship).
871d. at 218.
86

88

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.

89 id.
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freely consent to a search of luggage that he or she knows contains
drugs." 9° The Court's rationale for rejecting this argument was that
the reasonable person test assumes an innocent person, not a person
who has narcotics in their possession.
The decision in Bostick is important because the Court rejected
the Florida Supreme Court's per se ruling that when police board a
bus and ask for consent to search, an unconstitutional seizure has
taken place. Additionally, the Court expanded the permissible
scope of the investigatory stop test set forth in Delgado and went
beyond the issue of whether an individual would feel free to leave,
and instead asked whether that individual felt free to decline a law
enforcement official's request. Federal law enforcement agents,
relying on the Court's decision may now conduct numerous types
of investigatory techniques designed to combat the drug trade, sale
of illegal weapons, and the detection of other crimes without first
obtaining a warrant or even probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Although the Supreme Court in Bostick specifically stated that,
"[t]here is no doubt that if this same encounter had taken place
before Bostick boarded the bus or in the lobby of the bus terminal,
it would not rise to the level of a seizure," 9 the Court of Appeals
has developed a unique standard to preserve the rights of New York
citizens.
In two separate cases, decided in one opinion, the New York
Court of Appeals expanded its guidelines for what constitutes a
seizure under the New York Constitution. In People v. Hollman
and People v. Saunders,93 the Court of Appeals was confronted
with fact patterns similar to the scenario that the Bostick Court
assumed would clearly not be a seizure. 9 In Hollman, a narcotics
officer at the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York City
observed Hollnan coming down an escalator, looking around the
terminal, and carrying an orange bag. 95 After arriving at the main
90Id. at 437-38.
9!Id. at 434. See also Florida v. Rodriguez, 495 U.S. 1 (1984).
N.Y.2d 181, 590 N.E.2d 204, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1992).
9279
93

Id.

I See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text.
95 Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 185, 590 N.E.2d at 206, 581 N.Y.S. 2d at 621.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1998], Art. 10

778

TO URO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 14

level of the terminal, Hollman looked around again, and proceeded
to go back up the escalator. A few minutes later, Hollman was
observed descending the escalator with another individual who was
carrying a black bag. Hollman and the other individual from a
distance of approximately 10 feet, spoke to each other for
approximately 20 minutes while Hollman's bag was placed on the
ground between them.9 6 Hollman then went into the bathroom with
his bag and the other individual, and then returned to their position.
Approximately 15 minutes later, Hollman and the other individual
boarded the bus. Both the defendant and the individual placed their
bags in the rack two or three seats ahead of the ones they eventually
chose. The narcotics investigator approached Hollman and the
other individual; identified himself, and asked a few questions. The
investigator then asked where they had placed their luggage.
Hollman and the other individual replied that they did not have
any. 97 Both individuals as well as the other passengers denied
owning the black and orange bags. The narcotics officer then
opened the bags and found an ounce of crack cocaine in the orange
bag, and empty plastic vials and some white powder in the black
98
bag.
In Saunders, the same narcotics officer was at the same location,
accompanied by two other officers. 99 As they stood by the platform
where buses departed for Baltimore, Washington, and Virginia, the
officers observed the individuals who were boarding. The 5:00
bus began boarding at a quarter to five. Saunders, who joined the
line at approximately five minutes to five,"'O was carrying a gym
bag and appeared nervous. According to the narcotics officer,
Saunders was observed scanning the "interior of the boarding area
and at one time gave his place in the line to another passenger." 10
As Saunders approached the boarding area, he caught the officer's
eye, hesitated slightly, and then proceeded.'02
The officer
Id. at 185-86, 590 N.E.2d at 206, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
Id. at 186, 590 N.E.2d at 206, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
98 Id.
16

97

991 Id. at 187, 509 N.E.2d at 207, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 622.

00 Id.

101 Id.
102 Id.
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approached Saunders, identified himself and asked if he could speak
with him for a moment. Saunders stated that he was going to
Baltimore to visit family.'03 During this brief conversation it was
noted that Saunders repeatedly was looking around, spoke rapidly
and sounded nervous1'f The officer then asked Saunder's whether
he could search his bag. Saunders consented. The officer opened
the bag and found a large quantity of cocaine.' 5
In Hollman and Saunders, the defendants were charged with
criminal possession of a controlled substance, among other
violations, and moved to suppress the contraband on the ground that
the search and seizure violated their rights." 6 In both cases, a
hearing was held and the search was upheld by the trial court.1°"
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision. In
Hollman, the court found that the narcotics officers' questions of
Hollman were only a request for information and were appropriate
The court
absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
concluded that Hollman had abandoned the bag and relinquished
any right to privacy in its contents." Similarly in Saunders, the
divided Appellate Division held that the questioning by the law
enforcement officer of Saunders was only a request for information
and was appropriate absent reasonable suspicion. The Appellate
Division upheld the search of the bag in Saunders on the theory that
he had consented." 9 After this decision, the Hollman and Saunders
cases were consolidated and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals
was granted.
Former Chief Judge Wachtler, writing for the court, upheld the
search in Hollnan but reversed the decision in Saunders. 11 The
court's analysis was based upon the four-tier methodology
103id.

at 187-88, 509 N.E.2d at 207, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
Id. at 188, 509 N.E.2d at 207, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
106 Id. at 185-88, 509 N.E.2d at 206-08, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 621-23.
1
o1Id.
11 People v. Holmn, 168 A.D.2d 259, 261, 562 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (1st
104Id.
105

Dep't 1990).
1o People v. Saunders, 173 A.S.2d 239, 242, 569 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645 (1st
Dep't
1991).
0
See supra note 92.
11
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developed in People v. DeBour."' In DeBour, the court generated
a complex framework to analyze police encounters with individuals.
The first tier finds that where an officer only requests information
from an individual, the officer needs only an objective, credible
reason; not reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or any indication
of criminal activity. The second tier, known as the "common law
right of inquiry," is triggered when the officer has "a founded
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a somewhat
greater intrusion."1 2 The third tier states that when an officer has
reasonable suspicion that an individual was involved in a crime
rising to the level of a misdemeanor or felony, the officer is
permitted to forcibly detain that individual. The final tier states that
when an officer has probable cause that an individual has
committed a crime, an arrest is authorized. The court in Hollman
and Saunders was of the opinion that the issue revolved around
whether the particular fact scenario was encompassed by the first or
second tier.
The Court of Appeals held that the first tier of DeBour only
permits "a request for information involv[ing] basic, nonthreatening questions regarding, for instance, identity, address or
destination.""1 3 The court further stated that
[o]nce the officer asks more pointed questions that would
lead the person approached reasonably to believe that he or
she is suspected of some wrongdoing and is the focus of the
officer's investigation, the officer is no longer merely
seeking information. This has been a common-law inquiry
that must be supported by a founded suspicion that
4
criminality is afoot.1
Using these standards, the Court of Appeals set out to apply the
facts of Hollman and Saunders to the DeBour analysis. The court
"140 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976).

Id.at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
"I Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 185, 590 N.E.2d at 206, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
14 Id. Note, however, that this standard does not take into account whether,
12

as in Bostick, the individual should be judged as a reasonable person, not

involved in criminal activity, who has nothing to hide, and no reason to
suspect that he is being investigated.
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held that where the officer asked Hollman and the other individual
questions regarding their traveling plans, those questions were only
requests for information and were permissible." 5 When the officer
asked them whether they had luggage, the court found, this too was
only a request for information.11 6 At that point, the court held,
given the officers knowledge that the two individuals had brought
bags on the bus, the next question of whether the orange and black
bags belonged to them, was "a proper exercise of the officer's
common law right to inquire."'1 7 Thus, the court held that despite
the fact that a seizure had taken place, the seizure was proper as the
officer had a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
Despite the outcome in Hollman, the court's opinion clearly went
further than the Supreme Court's analysis of what conduct amounts
to a seizure. The fact scenario in Bostick was undoubtedly more
intrusive than in Hollman, yet the Supreme Court held that a
seizure had not taken place.
In the Saunders scenario, the Court of Appeals overruled the
Appellate Division, and suppressed the incriminating evidence as a
result of an unlawful search and seizure. The court's rationale was
that although the officer acted reasonably when asking Saunders
questions regarding his destination, the officer "crossed the
line.., when he asked to search the defendant's bag."" 8 The
court did not believe that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot and thus did not have the right to ask for
Saunders' consent to search the bag. Thus, the court held "the
defendant's consent was a product of the improper police
inquiry .... ,, Although it could be argued that the police
officers in both Hollman and Saunders did not have a reasonable
suspicion, the real issue is why New York requires a heightened
level of suspicion before a law enforcement officer may ask a
person for consent to search.

5Id. at 193, 590 N.E.2d at 211, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
11
116 1,d.
117 Id.

118d.at

194, 590 N.E.2d at 211, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 626.

9

11 Id.
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In both the Hollman and Saunders decisions the court refused to
adopt the standard established in Bostick.'2" The court held that
"encounters that fall short of Fourth Amendment seizures still
implicate the privacy interests of all citizens and that the spirit
underlying those words required the adoption of a State commonlaw method to protect the individual from arbitrary or intimidating
police conduct." 2 ' The Court of Appeals' decision, however, gave
no analytical reasoning for their divergence other than, "as a matter
of state common law, we will continue to apply DeBour to assess
the propriety of encounters that do not rise to the level of a seizure
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."'2
The DeBour decision and its interpretation by lower New York
courts has been the subject of great criticism. Even Professor
LaFave, stated that the DeBour four tier system will "likely result
in such confusion and uncertainty that neither police nor courts can
ascertain with any degree of confidence precisely what it takes to
meet any of these standards."
Indeed, as a result of DeBour and
its progeny, the New York Court of Appeals has been the subject of
great criticism in both the local and national press.' 24 Undoubtedly,
the Court of Appeals' decisions in Hollman, Saunders, and DeBour
have had a profound impact on the daily routines performed by law
enforcement officers. Lower courts, relying on these decisions
have suppressed incriminating evidence in many situations where
See supra notes 74-119 and accompanying text. The standard in Bostick
provides whether the individual felt free to leave and whether that individual
felt free to decline a law enforcement officer's request. Bostick, 501 U.S. at
433.
121Holinan, 79 N.Y.2d at 195, 590 N.E.2d at 212, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
'22Id. at 196, 590 N.E.2d at 212, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
123 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 9.3(e), at 135 (4th ed. 1996). Professor LaFave is a
proponent of civil liberties and a critic of the Supreme Court's recent pro law
enforcement ruling involving the Fourth Amendment.
124 See Mark Kagan, Federal and New York Approaches to Police
120

Encounters, N.Y. L.J, Dec. 13, 1996, at 1; Steven W. Fisher, Rethinking

Standardsfor Police Conduct, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 25, 1995, at 1; Mitchell Krapes
and Jay Lippman, Applying Common Sense to Search and Seizure, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 13, 1996, at 1; Max Boot, The Exoneration Rule, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4,
1997, at A18.
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the federal government, based upon its precedent, would have
denied the defendant's motion to suppress. In addition, many cases
are pleaded to lesser crimes and sentences in order to avoid the
suppression of incriminating evidence at pre-trial hearings.
Appellate and trial judges examining appeals and suppression
motions have the luxury of contemplating and analyzing each prong
of DeBour, its subtleties and the plethora of recent case law.
However, police officers in the field are left with little guidance on
how to operate in their encounters with suspected criminals.
People v. Turriago'2' provides an illustration of the problems
associated with this area of search and seizure law. In Turriago,
the Appellate Division reversed a murder conviction based upon an
"unlawful" search of Turriago's trunk. Turriago had been stopped
by police for speeding in an area in which police were looking for
individuals who were illegally hunting for deer. The arresting
officer asked Turriago about boxes in the back of his van and then
asked for his consent to look in the trunk. The defendant consented
and inside the trunk was the body of a murder victim. On appeal,
the murder conviction was reversed on the premise that the request
for consent was invalid as the police officer had no independent
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Relying on Hollman, the
Appellate Division stated that a request for consent was an
illustration of a common law right to inquire. Thus, the officer,
according to the court, only had the right to request information.
Since the officer had no suspicion that Turriago had actually
violated the hunting regulations, the request for consent to search
his trunk was invalid. 26
125 219 A.D.2d 383, 644 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1st Dep't 1996), aff'd 90 N.Y.2d
77, 681 N.E.2d 350, 659 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1997).
12690 N.Y.2d 77, 681 N.E.2d 350, 659 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1997). The Court of
Appeals refused to review the lower court's analysis involving the DeBour and
Hollman cases. Although the District Attorney's Office argued that the
Appellate Division's opinion should have been reversed as the " [r] equirement
of a founded suspicion of criminal activity does not apply when the police seek
consent to search a vehicle following a stop for a traffic violation .... " Id.
at 80, 681 N.E.2d at 351, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 184. The Court of Appeals
declined to address that issue as they believed it was not preserved. Id. The
court did, however, remit the case to the trial court after analyzing the
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The Supreme Court, in a case similar to Turriago, specifically
ruled that consent to search a car is valid even where the suspect is
free to leave. In Ohio v. Robinette,27 the Court, held, 8-1, that that
when a police officer asks for consent to search, the only issue is
the voluntariness of the consent. The defendant's knowledge, or
lack thereof that he may refuse to consent, is only one of the factors
to be considered. The Supreme Court's decision in Robinette
clearly did not mandate that reasonable suspicion 28be found in order
for a police officer request for consent to search.1
Another example of the United States Supreme Court's pragmatic
view involving the interpretation of what constitutes a seizure under
Terry occurred when the Court decided the case of California v.
Hodari D. 129 In Hodari D., two police officers were on routine

patrol in a high crime area in Oakland, California.' 3" Both officers
were in civilian clothing traveling in an unmarked car, but had
jackets bearing the word "Police" on the front and back. As the
officers came around a corner, they noticed four or five youths
surrounding a car which was parked at the curb.'
When the
3
2
youths saw the officers, they took flight.
This conduct aroused
the suspicion of the officers. One officer remained in the car, while
the other gave chase by foot. As Hodari emerged from an alley,
the officer chasing on foot was almost upon him when Hodari
threw a small object that appeared to be a rock.'
The officer
tackled Hodari and hand-cuffed him. A search of Hodari found
inevitable discovery doctrine and concluding that the lower court erred by not
applying that doctrine to the factual scenario as urged by the prosecutor. Id. at
85, 681 N.E.2d at 354, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
'27 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
" See, e.g., People v. Alexander, 189 A.D.2d 189, 595 N.Y.S.2d 279 (4th
Dep't 1993); People v. Boyd, 188 A.D.2d 239, 594 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1st Dep't
1993); People v. Bordeaux, 182 A.D.2d 1095, 583 N.Y.S.2d 865 (4th Dep't
1992); People v. Bailey, 204 A.D.2d 751, 204 A.D.2d 751, 611 N.Y.S.2d
372 (3d Dep't 1994); People v. Parker, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1995, at 33 (Dist.
Ct. Nassau Co. Apr. 17, 1995).
'29 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
13o Id. at 622.
131
Id.
132

Id. at 622-23.

"' Id. at 623.
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$130 and a pager. The rock which Hodari threw to the ground was
later tested and determined to be crack cocaine.
Hodari was prosecuted in juvenile court, where a motion to
suppress was denied. "The California Court of Appeals, however,
reversed, holding that Hodari had been seized when he saw the
officer running towards him, that this seizure was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence of cocaine had
to be suppressed as the fruit of that illegal seizure."3' The
Supreme Court granted certiorari 35 to decide whether the officer
had seized Hodari within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Hodari's claim that he was seized was based upon the proposition
that a seizure occurs, "when the officer, by means of physical force
or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen. " 13 In other words, Hodari's claim was that when the
officer gave chase, there was a "show of authority" that amounted
to a seizure in terms of the Fourth Amendment. The Court's
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that Hodari had not been
seized under the Fourth Amendment when the officer gave chase.
The Court's rationale was that in order to be seized by a "show of
authority" an individual must objectively feel that he is not free to
leave. 137 The Court stressed that although Hodari may not have felt
free to go about his business, the issue is "not whether the citizen
perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but
whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that
to a reasonable person." ' Thus, the Court concluded that Hodari
was not seized until he was tackled, and that the crack cocaine
which he threw to the ground was not the result of an
unconstitutional seizure.
In New York, Hodari's crack cocaine would likely be suppressed
as the fruit of an illegal police seizure. In People v. Holmes, ' two
134 Id.

,35 498 U.S. 807 (1990).
' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
'3 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
3
1 HodariD., 499 U.S. at 628.
1 81 N.Y.2d 1056, 916 N.E.2d 396, 601 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1993).
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police officers were in a marked car on Amsterdam Avenue
between 163rd and 164th Street in Manhattan and noticed a group
of men standing on the comer which was a known narcotics
location. One of the officers noticed a large bulge in Holmes's
jacket pocket and also saw Holmes leave the group. As the officer
called for Holmes to come over, Holmes ran away, and the officer
gave chase. While running down 163rd Street, the defendant threw
a plastic bag through a chain link fence. Holmes was eventually
caught, and the bag was recovered which was later determined to
contain crack cocaine. At trial, Holmes' motion to suppress was
denied. The Appellate Division, however, unanimously reversed
and suppressed the incriminating evidence as the result of an
improper seizure. 40
The Court of Appeals, using the DeBour guidelines,' upheld the
Appellate Division's decision to suppress the evidence. The Court
of Appeals held that "[w]hile the police may have had an objective
credible
reason
to
approach
defendant
to
request
information... those circumstances,
taken together with
defendant's flight, could not justify the significantly greater
intrusion of police pursuit."142 The Court of Appeals decision in
Holmes effectively indicates to the police that while they may have
a right to inquire of an individual where they have an objective,
credible reason, but if that individual takes flight, the police cannot
follow. The Court of Appeals attempted to justify their decision in
one paragraph, by stating "[i]f these circumstances could combine
with flight to justify pursuit, then in essence the right to inquire
would be tantamount to the right to seize, and there would, in fact,
be no right 'to be let alone.' That is not, nor should it be, the
law." 143 Judge Bellacosa, in his dissenting opinion, rationally
argued that, "something as elemental as running away from a
police officer, after a concededly lawful approach and inquiry,
should not be rendered per se legally meaningless, because the law
then is propelled beyond reasonable comprehension or
People v. Holmes, 181 A.D.2d 27, 585 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1st Dep't 1992).
See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
142 Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d at 1058, 619 N.E.2d at 398, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
'4o
4

Id.

143
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acceptance." 44 Under the guise of protecting the rights of every
New Yorker, the New York Court of Appeals has created a right to
runaway from the police without repercussion. It is difficult to
imagine any law abiding citizen that will utilize this new-founded
right. On the other hand, savvy criminals will routinely exercise
this right to flight. In known drug locations, individuals routinely
run and throw their bags of contraband to the ground.'45
Once an individual is stopped and is suspected of committing a
crime, it is a customary practice for a police officer to pat-down the
individual in order to ascertain whether the suspect is armed and
dangerous. In Terry v. Ohio,1 46 the Court approved a pat-down of a
suspect by a police officer when the officer has articulable suspicion
that the suspect is armed and poses a threat. As the purpose of the
pat-down is to defuse any potentially dangerous situation, it was
limited to areas where weapons may be discovered. Terry added
that where the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to
determine if the suspect is armed, the search is no longer valid and
any evidence found will be suppressed.147 The limitations of the
however, were re-visited in Minnesota v.
Terry pat-down,
48
Dickerson.1
In Dickerson, the Court confronted the issue of whether police
officers may seize non-threatening "contraband detected through
the sense of touch during a pat-down search." 149 In Dickerson, two
officers on routine patrol observed Dickerson leaving an apartment
that was a known crack house. Dickerson began walking toward
the police car, but upon making eye contact with the police and
spotting the car, Dickerson abruptly halted and began walking in

Id. at 1059, 619 N.E.2d at 399, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
141
Indeed, the author of this article has been in court when a judge advised a
defendant that when he was released he should run when he sees a patrol car in
the neighborhood.
146392 U.S. 1 (1968). See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
11 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1968). See also Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968).
148 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
144

49

1

Id. at 371.
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the opposite direction.150 Based upon these observations, the police
ordered Dickerson to submit to a pat-down, which revealed no
weapons. However, the officer who conducted the pat-down, felt a
small lump in Dickerson's jacket, which he "examined... with
[his] fingers and it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in
cellophane." 15' The officer then reached into Dickerson's pocket
and found a bag later determined to contain crack cocaine. The
trial court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, and the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the stop and frisk of Dickerson was
permissible under Terry, but the Minnesota Supreme Court further
held that the seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional. The
rationale was based upon its refusal to extend the plain view
doctrine to the sense of touch. In other words, although the officer
had a right to touch the cellophane bag, the plain view doctrine
would not permit its seizure on the grounds that "the sense of touch
is inherently less ... reliable than the sense of sight."' 52 Thus, the

Minnesota Supreme Court categorically held that when a pat-down
for weapons of an individual occurs, the seizure of contraband is
unconstitutional regardless of whether the officer knows that what
he is touching is contraband.
Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the
Minnesota Supreme Court ruling and held that an officer may seize
non-threatening contraband detected during a pat-down search for
weapons of a person whom the officer has briefly detained based
upon the officer's reasonable conclusion that criminal activity may
be afoot. Justice White wrote that:
[i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer
clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes
its identity immediately
apparent, there has been no
invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already
"' Id. at 368-69. Dickerson evidently had been reading current case law in
New York regarding the right to flight.

Unfortunately for him, Minnesota

does not follow New York's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. In New
York, the stop itself would have been invalid. See supra notes 134-138 and

accompanying text.
5 Id. at 369.
152 Minnesota

v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (1992).
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authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object
is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by
the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain
view context.15
Thus, the Court extended the purview of the Terry pat-down where
the contents are immediately apparent.' 4
The New York Court of Appeals, in two separate decisions, 5'
has refused to adopt the "plain touch" exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, in New York, where
police conduct a lawful pat-down search for weapons pursuant to
Terry, and it becomes immediately apparent to the officer
conducting the pat-down that the individual possesses other
contraband, the officer can not seize such items under the "plain
touch" exception. In People v. Diaz,15 6 two officers, while on
patrol in the lower east side of Manhattan, observed a group of
people congregating and passing objects from hand to hand. 7
Over the course of twenty- minutes of observation, the officers
noticed Diaz in the center of the group. Additionally, Diaz was
observed standing alongside of a parked car. When the officers
approached in their marked police car, Diaz began to walk away,
however, the officers called him over."5 As Diaz approached the
police car, the officers asked him to stop reaching into his front
pocket. Diaz ignored the officers wishes, and continued to place
his hand in his pocket. When Diaz stood next to the police car, a
bulge was noticed in his pocket. To insure his safety, one of the
officer's grabbed Diaz's front pocket. It then became immediately

15 Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76 (citation omitted).
1 In the case at hand, the Court ruled, 6-3, that the pat-down exceeded the
permissible scope as the officer determined that the lump was contraband only
after squeezing, sliding, and manipulating the contents of the pocket, which the
officer already knew contained no weapon.
15 People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940
(1993); In re Marrhonda G., 81 N.Y.2d 942, 613 N.E.2d 568, 662 N.Y.S.2d
597 (1993).
156 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1993).
157Id. at 108, 612 N.E.2d at 299, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
58

1

Id.
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apparent that he possessed vials.159 Diaz attempted to flee, but one
of the officers was able to pull him partially through the car
window. While doing so, he removed 18 vials of crack cocaine
from his pocket.,60
Prior to Diaz's trial, he filed a motion to suppress the contraband
based upon an illegal search and seizure. The trial court granted
Diaz's motion on the basis that the initial stop and pat-down
violated his rights, in that, the police had no reasonable suspicion to61
stop him in the first place. The Appellate Division reversed
holding that there was reasonable suspicion for the stop and that the
subsequent search and seizure was permissible based upon what the
officer felt during the legal pat-down of Diaz. The Court of
Appeals declined to review the Appellate Division's decision that
the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and conduct a patdown of Diaz.162 The Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he only legal
issue before us is whether ...

the information allegedly obtained

by Officer Healey through his sense of touch in conducting the patdown justified the subsequent search of defendant's pocket."1 63 In
holding that the officer was not justified in his search, the Court of
Appeals held that where "Officer Healey knew that defendant's
pocket did not contain a weapon, he was not authorized to search
the pocket or seize its contents... ." 164 Although the People
argued that Officer Healey's actions were justified under an
extension of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, 165
the Court of Appeals disagreed and held that "the plain view
exception cannot logically be extended to concealed items which are

159Id.

160 Id. at 108, 612 N.E.2d at 300, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
161People v. Diaz, 181 A.D.2d 597, 581 N.Y.S.2d 774

(1992).
People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 108, 612 N.E.2d 298, 300, 595
N.Y.S.2d 940, 942 (1993)
163Id. at 108-09, 612 N.E.2d at 300, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
164 Id at 109, 612 N.E.2d at 300, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
,65 Id. at 110, 612 N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943. The People argued
that a plain-touch exception should be adopted in New York as it is directly
analogous to the plain view exception.
162
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discoverable only through touch.""66 Thus, in New York, where
the police with reasonable suspicion, pat-dovm a suspect for
weapons and it becomes immediately apparent that the suspect
possesses contraband, the police cannot seize such evidence.
Therefore, if the police have probable cause to make a lavful
arrest, they may search the suspect incident to the arrest.' 6
However, where the police act on a reasonable suspicion and patdown the suspect for weapons and therein find contraband, an
arrest cannot be justified upon that search as the contraband cannot
be used in the probable cause determination.
H. WHAT CONSTITUTES PROBABLE CAUSE?
The New York Court of Appeals has also deviated from the
established principles laid out by the United States Supreme Court
to determine when a search warrant, based upon information
obtained from an informant, constitutes probable cause. Basing the
deviation on independent state grounds, the Court of Appeals in
People v. Johnson,"6 People v. Griminger,'69 and People v.
DiFalco,170 refused to follow the totality of the circumstances test
established by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v.
Gates.

171

166
Id. at 111, 612 N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943. Similarly, in the

case of In re Marrhonda G., 81 N.Y.2d 942, 613 N.E.2d 568, 597 N.Y.S.2d
662 (1993), the Court of Appeals suppressed incriminating evidence and held
that, "[w ]e disagree with the conclusion of the courts below, however, that the
warrantless search of respondent's bag was justified under a so-called 'plaintouch' exception to the warrant requirement. We have rejected that exception
this session in People v. Diaz 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d
940 decided today." Marrahonda(G, 81 N.Y.2d at 945, 613 N.E.2d at 569,
597 N.Y.S.2d at 663. See also People v. Rosado, 214 A.D.2d 375, 625
N.Y.S.2d 162 (1st Dep't 1995); People v. Peterson, N.Y. L.J. April 10,
1995, p.29; People v. Calizaire, 208 A.D.2d 378, 617 N.Y.S.2d 10 (lst
Dep't 1994).
1 See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1967).
168 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985).
169
71 N.Y.2d 635, 524 N.W.2d 409, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1988).
170 80 N.Y.2d 693, 610 N.E.2d 352, 594 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1993).
171462

U.S. 213 (1983).
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Prior to Gates, federal courts used a two prong test to evaluate
whether a search warrant, based upon information supplied by an
informant, had sufficient probable cause to comply with the Fourth
Amendment. This examination was based upon the Court's
decisions in Aguilar v. Texas172 and Spinelli v. United States.'

The Aguilar-Spinelli test required a magistrate to analyze probable
cause based upon the informant's basis of knowledge as well as his
veracity or reliability. In Gates, however, the Court found that this
rigid two-prong approach was unnecessary to comply with the
Fourth Amendment's requirement that a search and seizure be
based upon probable cause. The Court in Gates held that the
proper standard for determining probable cause for issuance of a
search warrant based on hearsay from an informant was the totality
of the circumstances. Although the Court adopted this approach in
1983, the New York Court of Appeals still requires examination of
both prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli when making a determination as to
whether probable cause exists for a search warrant. In some
instances, the New York Court of Appeals has gone even further,
requiring the magistrate or trial judge to inquire as to exactly how
the informant acquired his knowledge that is the basis for the search
warrant.

In Gates,'74 the Supreme Court upheld a search conducted by
police officers of an automobile and a home after receiving an
anonymous letter that stated that Mr. and Mrs. Gates made their
living selling drugs. In addition, the letter stated that the Gates'
purchased their drugs in Florida and gave the date of the next
transaction to occur. Moreover, the letter explained in detail how
the Gates' purchased and transported narcotics. 17' After receiving
172 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
173393

U.S. 410 (1969).
174 462 U.S. 213, 225 (1983).
'"Specifically, the letter stated that:
[t]his letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your
town who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They
are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off

Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys
are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida,
where she leaves it to be loaded up with the drugs, then

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/10

36

Wigdor: Fourth Amendment

1998

FOURTHAMENDMENT

793

this anonymous letter, law enforcement officials confirmed the
Gates' address as well as an airplane reservation to Florida in the
name of "L. Gates." 176 Furthermore, agents watched Gates board
the plane to Florida and upon arrival, take a taxi to a nearby
Holiday Inn. Gates went to a room registered under the name of
Susan Gates. The next morning agents saw an unidentified woman
and Gates leave the motel in a car that was registered by Gates.
Based on the anonymous letter and the agents' observations, a
search warrant was issued for the Gates' residence and the
automobile. The police searched the trunk of the car and found
approximately 350 pounds of marijuana. A search of the Gates'
home, revealed the presence of marijuana, weapons, and other
contraband.
The Gates moved to suppress the incriminating evidence and
claimed it was obtained in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Specifically, they claimed that the search
warrant lacked the requisite probable cause required to comply with
the Fourth Amendment. The Illinois Circuit court agreed, and
suppressed all of the inculpatory evidence. The court reasoned that
the affidavit for the warrant lacked probable cause to "believe that
the Gates' automobile and home contained the contraband in
question."" The decision was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate
court, 7 as well as the Supreme Court of Illinois.' 79 The Supreme
Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after she
drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down
there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to
drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has
the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently
they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their
basement. They brag about the fact they never have to work,
and make their entire living on pushers. I guarantee if you
watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are
friends with some big drug dealers, who visit their house
often.
Id. at 225.
176Id.at 226.
'71Id. at 227.
178

Illinois v. Gates, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980).
v. Gates, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981).

' 79 Illinois
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Court of Illinois found that the anonymous letter, alone, could not
be enough to sustain the issuance of a search warrant. However,
the court stated that corroboration by law enforcement officials
could be sufficient to permit the issuance of a search warrant based
upon probable cause. In this particular instance, however, the court
relied on the two-prong test of Aguilar-Spinelli and held that there
was not sufficient corroboration. The Supreme Court of Illinois
believed that the anonymous letter had to satisfy both prongs of the
Aguilar-Spinelli test, in that the letter had to reveal the writers

"basis of knowledge" as well as his "veracity" or "reliability."
The Supreme Court of Illinois believed that the "veracity" prong
was not fulfilled as " [t]here was simply no basis [for] conclud[ing]
that the anonymous person was credible." 180
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari81 and
overruled the Supreme Court of Illinois. l"' The Court held that
rather than applying the Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test when
making a determination of whether a search warrant has the
requisite probable cause, the "totality of the circumstances" must
be evaluated. The Court found that:
[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. 83

180 Gates, 423 N.E.2d at 891.
181 454

U.S. 1140 (1982).
' It is interesting to note that originally this decision was intended to adopt
the good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment. After hearing oral
argument and receiving appellate briefs, the Justices asked that the litigants
address the question of the good faith exception. See Illinois v. Gates, 459
U.S. 1028 (1982). In addition, Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion
of the Court, apologized for not having addressed that issue in the Court's
opinion. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 216 (1983).
183

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
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The Court reasoned that the "totality of the circumstances" was
an appropriate standard because the "veracity," "reliability," and
"basis of knowledge" of the informant are all evaluated. The
Court found that the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test greatly
diminished the value of police work based upon information
provided by informants. Thus the Court adopted a framework
enabling magistrates to analyze warrant applications under the
totality of the circumstances rather than follow the rigid
requirements of the two-prong test.
Four decisions by the New York Court of Appeals demonstrate
its divergence from the standards established in Gates. Rather than
adopt an approach that enables a judge to analyze all of the factors
surrounding a warrant application based upon information from an
informant, New York requires that both prongs of the AguilarSpinelli test be met. Thus, if an informant is known by law
enforcement officials as providing extremely reliable tips regarding
criminal activity or is a very trustworthy citizen, a warrant
application's failure to set forth the basis of his knowledge would be
an absolute bar to issuing the warrant. Conversely, if an informant
gives a detailed description of ongoing criminal activity and how he
obtained that information, a warrant cannot be issued if there is no
information in the warrant application regarding the informant's
veracity or reliability.
The New York Court of Appeals has refused to adopt the
"totality of the circumstances" analysis in determining whether a
search or arrest warrant has sufficient probable cause. Relying on
independent state grounds, the Court of Appeals has refused to
follow the Supreme Court's precedent in Gates. For example, in
People v. Griminger,1 4 the Court of Appeals suppressed 10 ounces
of marijuana and over $6,000 in cash and drug-related
paraphernalia and held that the search of Griminger's home was
based upon a search warrant that lacked the requisite probable
cause. The search warrant affidavit was based on an informant
who had been arrested by the United States Secret Service for
counterfeiting. The informant told the Secret Service that he knew
that Griminger kept a large quantity of cocaine in his bedroom and
'14

71 N.Y.2d 635, 524 N.E.2d 409, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1988).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

39

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1998], Art. 10

796

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 14

attic. An affidavit to search Griminger's home was prepared and
stated that the informant, on numerous occasions, had observed
marijuana and cocaine in the bedroom and attic. In addition, the
affidavit stated that the informant had recently seen 150 to 200
pounds of marijuana at Griminger's home. Based upon this
information, a Magistrate issued the search warrant and the
inculpatory evidence was obtained.
The Court of Appeals
suppressed the evidence and held that
[w]e are not persuaded.. . that the Gates approach
provides a sufficient measure of protection, and we now
hold that, as a matter of state constitutional law, the
Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test should be applied in
determining whether there is a sufficient factual predicate
upon which to issue a search warrant. "85
The court went on to state that the two-prong test is necessary
to insure, "the rights of privacy and liberty upon the word of an
unreliable hearsay informant, a danger we perceive under the
Gates totality-of-the-circumstances test."'' 16 Applying the twoprong test to the affidavit, the Court of Appeals held that the
reliability prong was not satisfied, and thus the warrant invalid
and the evidence suppressed."8 7
A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant when
the officer has probable cause to believe that such person has
committed a crime. Probable cause may be supplied, in whole or
in part, through hearsay information. Therefore, it is important
to analyze how the courts interpret the determination of probable
cause in non-warrant cases when the police make an arrest based
upon information supplied by an informant or other hearsay
means.

Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d at 639, 524 N.E.2d at 411, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
Id.at 641, 524 N.E.2d at 412, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
187 It is also important to note that had the New York Court's adopted the
good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, the
evidence could be admitted despite the lack of probable cause. See infra notes
344-379 and accompanying text.
185

8

16
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In People v. Elwell,1 88 for example, the New York Court of
Appeals upheld the suppression of an indictment for criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree. The police received a
call from an informant with whom they had previously worked and
who had provided them with reliable information. The informant
advised the police that Elwell was in possession of a .25 caliber
automatic pistol and was operating a red Le Mans with New York
registration 915 DWY with a CB antenna on the back. In addition,
the informant provided the police with the location of the
automobile and said that it would be leaving soon. The informant
did not give the police any indication how he knew of this
information. The police went to the location provided by the
informant and found the car. Shortly thereafter, Elwell and another
person went into the car and were eventually stopped by the police.
A search of the passenger compartment of the car revealed a .25
caliber Colt automatic under the seat of the car. The Court of
Appeals held that the evidence must be suppressed as the informant
never revealed his basis for his knowledge. The Court found that:
[I]t is not enough that a number, even a large number, of
details of noncriminal activity supplied by the informant be
confirmed. Probable cause for such an arrest or search will
have been demonstrated only when there has been
confirmation of sufficient details suggestive of or directly
related to the criminal activity informed about to make
reasonable the conclusion that the informer has not simply
passed along rumor, or is not involved ...

in an effort to

'frame' the person informed against. 89
Therefore, the court held that a "warrantless search or arrest will
be sustained only when police observe conduct that is suggestive of,
or directly related " 190 to the criminal activity or where the
information furnished to the police is "so detailed as to make clear
it must have been based on personal observation of that activity." 9
18850

189 Id.
190 Id.

N.Y.2d 231, 406 N.E.2d 471, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1980).
at 234-35, 406 N.E.2d at 473, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
at 241, 406 N.E. 2d at 477, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 662.

191Id.
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In the instant case, however, the court found that the police had not
observed any conduct which indicated that criminal activity was
being conducted.
The Court of Appeals' decision in Elwell went further than the
Supreme Court's decision in Aguilar v. Texas.' 92 The Court of
Appeals held that a determination of probable cause in a warrantless
search or arrest can only be satisfied where the police make firsthand observations consistent with criminal activity. Thus, the basis
of knowledge prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, in non-warrant
cases, cannot be met by the totality of the circumstances, or even
by an informant providing reliable information which includes his
basis of knowledge. New York requires that the information be
reliable, that its basis be known, and that the police witness
criminal activity.
People v. Johnson,'93 also illustrates the problems associated with
applying the two-prong basis of knowledge-veracity test when
police make an arrest without a warrant. In Johnson, the Court of
Appeals applied the Aguilar-Spinelli test and suppressed two
inculpatory statements that the court found were the result of an
arrest that lacked probable cause. Although Johnson was convicted
of murdering a grocery store owner during a robbery, the Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction finding it was based on an unlawful
arrest. Shortly after the felony-murder, law enforcement officials
questioned Bolivar Abreu who initially denied any knowledge of the
incident. Eventually, however, Abreu provided the officers with
information that implicated Johnson. Abreu stated that he had
witnessed a conversation between Johnson and another person in
which they discussed the crime. 94 Moreover, Abreu admitted that
he had traded a .38 caliber revolver for a rifle prior to the robbery.
Johnson was thereafter arrested based upon this information. He
was read his Miranda rights and eventually confessed to murdering
the shop owner. He later repeated the confession in a videotape.
The Court of Appeals conducted an analysis of the Aguilar-Spinelli
rules, and concluded that Abreu's information lacked the requisite
192378 U.S. 108 (1964).
66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985).
Id. at 402, 488 N.E.2d at 442, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 621 n.1.

193
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reliability to warrant a determination of probable cause by the
arresting police officers. 195 Despite the fact that Abreu's statement
was against his penal interest, the court concluded that it lacked the
requisite reliability. Moreover, the Court of Appeals declined to
apply the totality of the circumstances test enunciated in Gates to
this situation and stated:
This appeal presents one of those situations in which we
believe that the aims of predictability and precision in
judicial review of search and seizure cases and the
protection of the individual rights of our citizens are best
promoted by applying State constitutional standards. In
guidance to police
doing so we also provide 'bright line'
96
duties.
their
personnel in performing
The analysis by the court was clearly an effort to prevent the
United States Supreme Court from reversing their decision. By
basing the decision in Johnson on independent state grounds, the
New York Court of Appeals prevented review of their finding that
the "totality of the circumstances" test in Gates should not apply to
non-warrant cases.1 97
In recent years the New York Court of Appeals has consistently
refused to adopt the totality of the circumstances test when
examining whether probable cause exists in a search warrant or
when making an arrest. As a result, incriminating evidence and
confessions are suppressed. Furthermore, many requests by
police for search warrants are rejected by prosecutors who
believe that the evidence obtained will ultimately be suppressed
based upon the hypertechnical analysis of the Court of Appeals.
11 Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 401-03, 488 N.E.2d at 441-43, 497 N.Y.S.2d at
620-22 (citations omitted).
196Id. at 407, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
"I See also People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 375, 452 N.E.2d 1185, 1188,
465 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860 (1983) (holding that the two pronged Aguilar-Spinelli
rule must be established for there to be probable cause when making a
wvarrantless arrest); People v. DiFalco, 80 N.Y.2d 693, 696, 610 N.E.2d 352,
353, 594 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (1993) (holding that probable cause for a
warrantless arrest may be based on hearsay, but only upon a showing that both
the basis of knowledge and veracity components of Agidlar-Spinelli are met).
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Many of these requests are reasonable, and would surely be
upheld under federal guidelines. However, in New York, a
prosecutor most review a search warrant under both prongs of the
Aguilar-Spinelli test.
II. PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The issue of whether a search warrant has probable cause
becomes more complicated when the items sought by the police are
presumptively protected by the United States Constitution's First
Amendment. In New York, a higher standard of probable cause is
necessary when the police endeavor to search areas presumptively
protected by the First Amendment. The issue of whether a higher
standard of probable cause is necessary for the issuance of a search
warrant for items protected by the First Amendment was analyzed
by the Supreme Court in New York v. P.J. Video. 98 In P.J. Video,
two individuals were charged with six counts of obscenity after a
search warrant was obtained and executed recovering numerous
videotapes in violation of the New York Penal Law. The
application for the search warrant was based upon an investigation
conducted by the Erie County District Attorney's Office. An
investigator rented ten videocassettes, viewed them in their entirety,
and executed an affidavit summarizing the theme and conduct
depicted in each film." 9 Thereafter, a justice of the New York
Supreme Court issued the warrant, authorizing the search of the
store and the seizure of the movies. Thirteen movies were seized in
all, and the store owner moved for suppression based upon his
belief that the search warrant lacked probable cause because the
issuing justice had not personally viewed the movies. The Supreme
Court granted the motion and dismissed the charges. The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the decisionY ° on different
grounds. The Court of Appeals held that there is a higher standard
for evaluating a warrant application seeking to seize things that are
198 475 U.S. 868 (1986).

199 Id. at 870.
200 People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 566, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 493
N.Y.S.2d 988 (1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 868 (1986).
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arguably covered by the First Amendment. Specifically, the Court
of Appeals held that, "[t]here is a higher standard for evaluation of
a warrant application seeking to seize such things as books and
films, as distinguished from one seeking to seize weapons or
drugs."' °' Applying this "higher standard" to the search warrant at
hand, the Court of Appeals held that the affidavits by the District
Attorney's Office were insufficient because they failed to
adequately describe the movies in question and "[t]he descriptions
of the action [were] not supplemented by references to the narrative
or dialogue of the films... [and made] no attempt to reveal the
story line (or lack of one) of the films ...."m In conclusion, the

Court of Appeals held that the affidavits did not contain sufficient
information to permit the sitting justice to apply the higher standard
of probable cause and determine whether such films were
obscene."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,2 and reversed the Court
]n application for a warrant authorizing
of Appeals, holding that "[a
the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the First
Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of
probable cause used to review warrant applications generally."2
The Supreme Court then remanded back to the Court of Appeals
"for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."m
Any thought that the Court of Appeals would evaluate the search
warrant based upon the Supreme Court's decision was quickly
dispelled in People v. P.J. Video, Inc.,m7 when the Court of
Appeals, per Judge Simons, held that the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the Court of Appeals, "so that we could decide whether
Article I, § 12 of the State Constitution imposes a more exacting
standard for the issuance of search warrants authorizing the seizure
1Id. at 569, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 991.

Id. at 571, 483 N.E.2d at 1124, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 992. The five movies
that formed the basis of the obscenity charges were, "California Valley Girls,"
"Taboo II," "Taboo," "All American Girls," and "Debbie Does Dallas." Id.
203 Id. at 572, 483 N.E.2d at 1125, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
474 U.S. 918 (1985).
205 New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 875 (1986).
26Id. at 878.
207 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986).
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of allegedly obscene material than does the Federal
Constitution., 20 ' The Court of Appeals held that the New York
State Constitution requires a higher standard of probable cause than
does the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when
examining whether probable cause exists to search an item
presumptively protected by the First Amendment. Judge Simons,
attempting to justify the court's opinion, stated that, "[b]ecause the
materials presumptively enjoyed First Amendment protection--the
magistrate was required to perform his duty with 'scrupulous
exactitude.'"2 °9 The court went on to add that the Magistrate's
review of the affidavits supplied by the District Attorney's Office
were insufficient as a matter of law because they "contained only
an itemized list of sexual acts, and the police officer's conclusory
assertion that the list represented the 'content and character' of the
films or that such scenes appeared 'throughout' the films. '' 210 As
the opinion gave no inclination as to the artistic value, story line, or
Judge Simons' opinion of the films "California Valley Girls,"
"Taboo I," Taboo II," "All American Girls," and "Debbie Does
Dallas," it is difficult to imagine any further detail with regard to
these "movies" that was not depicted in the affidavits drafted by the
District Attorney's Office.
The court's decision in P.J. Video seems to imply that a judge
issuing a search warrant requesting a search of material
presumptively protected by the First Amendment must view, in its
entirety, all items contained in the warrant. Judge Simons stated
that because the Magistrate "had permitted the police officer to
make the determination for him that the films as a whole appealed
predominantly to prurient sex and lacked value," he lacked
probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant.21
Attempting to justify this more rigorous standard, Judge Simons
208

Id. at 299, 501 N.E.2d at 558, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 909.

Strangely,
however, nowhere in the Supreme Court's opinion did they ask the Court of
Appeals to look at their State Constitution to determine whether it diverged
from the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, the original Court of Appeals
decision only mentioned the New York State Constitution once.
209

Id. at 300, 501 N.E.2d at 557, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (citation omitted).

210

Id.at 301, 501 N.E.2d at 559, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 910.

" Id. (citation omitted).
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first recognized that the language in the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution are identical.
Judge Simons, relying upon a "noninterpretive" analysis, which
purportedly examines the history of the "right" and the tradition of
the State as well as distinctive attitudes of the citizens, concluded
that a more exacting standard of probable cause was necessary.
Judge Simons held that a higher standard "reflect[s] a concern, that
the Fourth Amendment rules governing police conduct have been
muddied, and judicial supervision of the warrant process diluted,
thus heightening the danger that our citizens'212 rights against
unreasonable police intrusions might be violated."
Thus, not only has the Court of Appeals declined to adopt the
"totality of the circumstances" approach established in Gates, 213 the
Court of Appeals has also imposed a stricter standard for the
issuance of a search warrant where the proceeds of such warrant
contain material presumptively protected by the First Amendment.
Because the issuing judge must review the warrant application with
"scrupulous exactitude," not relying upon an affidavit from the
District Attorney's Office, and viewing or reading the material
presumably covered by the First Amendment, the search warrant
process in this area has become extremely difficult. In areas such
as computer crime and child pornography, such an exacting
standard of probable cause for material presumptively protected by
the First Amendment will make law enforcement in these areas
particularly difficult. In order to obtain a search warrant in this
area, the Court of Appeals requires a showing that criminal activity
is actual!y taking place, rather than the typical standard of showing
that there exists probable cause or a substantial chance that such
'criminal activity exists.
IV. AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The New York Court of Appeals has dramatically diverged from
the standards set by the United States Supreme Court in the area of
212 Id. at

305, 501 N.E.2d at 562, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See supra notes 168-197 and
accompanying text.
213
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automobile searches and seizures. Three New York Court of
Appeals' cases demonstrate the inconsistencies involved in this area
of search and seizure law. Basing their decisions on independent
state grounds, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v.
Belton,2 4 People v. Class, 2 5 and People v. Torres216 chose not to
follow the framework established by the United States Supreme
Court. More importantly, each decision expanded the rights of
criminal defendants when police search an automobile and recover
incriminating evidence.
In People v. Belton2 7 [hereinafter "Belton I"], the New York
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's conviction of Belton
for attempted possession of a controlled substance in the sixth
degree, and granted his motion to suppress evidence seized by state
troopers. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
New York v. Belton,18 reversed the decision of New York's highest
court. On remand, the Court of Appeals, while upholding Belton's
conviction, rejected the Supreme Court's rationale thus expanding
the rights of criminal defendants further than the Supreme Court
envisioned.
In Belton I, Belton and three passengers were speeding on the
New York State Thruway when they passed a state trooper who
was traveling in another lane. The trooper overtook Belton's
vehicle and signaled for Belton to pull over to the side of the road.
As the lone trooper approached the stopped vehicle, he noticed the
smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. The trooper
requested to see Belton's driver's license and automobile
registration and discovered that none of the four men owned the
vehicle or was related to the owner. The trooper then peered into
the vehicle and observed an envelope on the floor of the automobile
which he recognized as the type that is typically used to sell
marijuana. Accordingly, the trooper ordered all of the occupants
out of the car, subjected them to a pat-down frisk, and removed the
55 N.Y.2d 49, 432 N.E.2d 745, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1982).
67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986).
216 74 N.Y.2d 224, 543 N.E.2d 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989).
217 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1980).
218 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
214

215
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envelope from the car. Upon inspection, the trooper discovered
that the envelope, in fact, contained marijuana, and he placed the
four occupants under arrest. The trooper then re-entered the
vehicle to conduct a search of the passenger compartment and
seized several marijuana cigarette butts that were lying in the
ashtray. The trooper also checked the pockets of several jackets that
were lying on the back seat, discovering a small amount of cocaine
and defendant's identification in one of them.
Belton pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a criminal
substance in the sixth degree after the court denied his motion to
suppress the cocaine. A unanimous Appellate Division affirmed,
holding the warrantless search of the jacket permissible as incident
to the defendant's arrest for possession of marijuana. Belton
appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
In Belton , the New York Court of Appeals held that the
warrantless search of the zippered pocket of Belton's jacket could
not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest. The court
rationalized that once Belton was removed from his car and placed
under arrest, only a search of his person and the area within his
immediate control; the area within which "defendant might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence," 2 19
was
permissible under the Fourth Amendment and that Belton's jacket
was not within this area.
Further, the court stated that a
warrantless search of objects under the exclusive control of the
police can no longer be justified as incident to an arrest.
Specifically, the court adopted a bright line rule stating, "once [the]
defendant had been removed from the automobile and placed under
arrest, a search of the interiors of a private receptacle safely within
the exclusive custody and control of the police may not be upheld as
incident to his arrest." 2'
In so holding, the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the
factual determination of the two lower courts that at the time the
Belton, 50 N.Y.2d at 450, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576
(1980).
Id. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
221 Belton, 50 N.Y.2d at 452, 407 N.E.2d at 423, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 577
(citations omitted).
219
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jacket was searched, the arrest process was still in progress "and
neither the suspects themselves nor their property had as yet been
reduced to the exclusive control of the police. " ' a The New York
Court of Appeals retrospectively substituted the judgement of the
trooper on the scene with its own judgment. Judge Gabrielli in his
dissent stated:
[t]he majority believes that since the [four] suspects were
standing outside the car at the time of the search and had
been told that they were under arrest, both their persons
and their property had thereby been conclusively and safely
reduced to the complete control of the officer, as a matter
of law. Although one might well wish that all criminal
suspects could so readily be subdued as a matter of law, I
cannot agree with a decision that requires a police officer to
stake his very life upon such a questionable presumption." s
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with
the New York Court of Appeals finding that the jacket, as it lay on
the back seat of the car, was out of the immediate control of Belton.
In upholding the search of Belton's jacket pocket, the Supreme
Court stated that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of
the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally,
even if not inevitably, within the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.''"
Moreover, the Court noted the need for a "single, familiar
standard" to guide police officers on the street who are forced to
make important decisions regarding "[the] balance [of] social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront" in an extremely limited time.' The Court concluded by
holding that an officer who has made an arrest of an occupant of a
vehicle may, incident to that arrest, search the passenger
222

Id. at 454, 407 N.E.2d at 424, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Gabrielli, J.,

dissenting).
223

Id. at 455, 407 N.E.2d at 425, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 579 (Gabrielli, J.,

dissenting).
"' Belton, 435 U.S. at 460 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969)).
221

Id. at 458 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/10

50

1998

Wigdor: Fourth Amendment

FOURTHAMENDMENT

807

compartment of that vehicle and search the contents of any
containers found therein.
On remand, the New York State Court of Appeals refused to
adopt the Supreme Court's holding, stating, "[w]e do not find it
necessary to consider the Supreme Court's rationale as applied to
our [state] Constitution."' Instead, the Court of Appeals criticized
the Supreme Court's interpretation of their own decision in Chimel
v. Calfornia,' stating that the Court had departed from its
rationale in Chimel, and that "once the [lawful search incident to
arrest] exception is employed to justify a warrantless search for
objects outside an arrested person's reach it no longer has any
distinct spatial boundary."2
The Court of Appeals, however,
chose to uphold the validity of the search of the jacket pocket under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The majority decision in the Belton remand was forcefully
criticized by Judge Gabrielli who concurred in the result writing,
"the majority expressly rejects the rationale articulated by the
Supreme Court, under the banner of our State Constitution, and
upholds the search leading to defendant's conviction upon an
independent rationale not addressed or mentioned by the majority
on the previous appeal to this court." 9 Judge Gabrielli went on to
accuse the court of imposing restrictions upon legitimate and
acceptable police activity not prohibited by the State Constitution,
stating, "[o]ur power to interpret the State Constitution is not
tantamount to the power to legislate. " 23 Judge Gabrielli continued
by reminding his associates of their recent decision in People v.
Ponder3' where a unanimous court held that "section 12 of article I
of the New York State Constitution conforms with the Fourth
Amendment regarding the proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and [that] this identity of language supports a

21

Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 51, 432, 432 N.E.2d at 745, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 874.

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
n' Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 53, 432 N.E.2d at 747, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
29Id. at 56, 432 N.E.2d at 749, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
0 Id. at 57, 432 N.E.2d
m,
at 749, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
231 54 N.Y.2d 160, 429 N.E.2d 735, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1981).
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policy of uniformity in both State and Federal courts." 23' 2 In
closing, Judge Gabrielli stated that if a police officer conducts
himself within the mandate of the Fourth Amendment, his actions
should not be found impermissible under the State Constitution.23 a
The effect of the Court of Appeals rationale in Belton can readily
be observed by the court's decision in People v. Gokey. 234 In
Gokey, police boarded a bus with an arrest warrant for Gokey on a
larceny charge. Accompanying the three police officers was a
canine sniff dog. As Gokey got off the bus he was placed under
arrest. Gokey placed a duffle bag he was carrying between his
legs. The dog indicated that the bag contained an illegal substance.
Gokey was handcuffed and the bag was searched revealing eleven
ounces of marijuana. Gokey pleaded guilty to criminal possession
of marijuana in the third degree and the appellate division affirmed.
The Court of Appeals, relying on its interpretation in Belton
reversed the conviction. The Court of Appeals stated that the
Supreme Court's interpretation in Belton provided a general rule
that "a custodial arrest will always provide sufficient justification
for police to search any container within the immediate control of
the arrestee. [And] [u]nder this standard, it is clear that defendant's
Federal constitutional rights were not violated." ''
The Court of
Appeals proceeded, however, to "[decline] to interpret the State
Constitution's protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures so narrowly." 236 Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction in Gokey because the police, in the opinion of the court,
did not fear for their safety, and therefore could not have
reasonably believed that the search of the bag was necessary. It is
clear that had New York adopted the bright line test enunciated in
Belton, Gokey's conviction would have been upheld.
People v. Class 7 also demonstrates the Court of Appeals
divergence from the Supreme Court in the area of automobile
232

Id. at 165, 429 N.E.2d at 737, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 59.

See Belton, 55

N.Y.2d at 57, 432 N.E.2d at 749, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
231Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 58, 432 N.E.2d at 750, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
21 60 N.Y.2d 309, 457 N.E.2d 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1983).
23 id. at 312, 457 N.E.2d at 724, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
236 id.
237 63 N.Y.2d 491, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1984).
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searches and seizures. In Class, police observed a car which was
speeding and which had a cracked windshield (both traffic
violations).
The police directed Class to pull over.
Class
immediately exited the automobile, approached the patrol car, and
provided the officer with his registration and proof of insurance,
but failed to provide his driver's license. In the meantime, a second
officer approached Class's vehicle, and checked the door jam for
the vehicle identification number [hereinafter "VIN'"]. No VIN
was found. In an effort to locate the VIN, the officer reached into
the car and moved some papers revealing the handle of a gun that
was protruding from underneath the seat. The weapon was seized
and Class was arrested.
The Bronx County Supreme Court denied Class' motion to
suppress the gun as evidence, concluding that although the officers
had no reason to believe the automobile was stolen, their actions
were nonetheless reasonable "in light of defendant's immediately
exiting the car and walking over to the police car, instead of waiting
in the automobile, coupled with the fact that the defendant did not
have a driver's license in his possession."" 8 Class subsequently
pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the third
degree and was sentenced to five years probation. The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court, First Department, affirmed the
conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the two lower courts
and ruled to suppress the gun as evidence, holding that "a police
officer's non-consensual entry into an individual's automobile to
determine the VIN violates the Federal and State Constitutions
where it is based solely on a stop for a traffic infraction."2 9 The
court reasoned that there exists many areas inside a car, such as
underneath the seats, which cannot be viewed from outside the
vehicle, and in which the owner of the car retains a legitimate
expectation of privacy. When the officer reached into the vehicle to
determine the VIN, such hidden areas were exposed, leading to the
discovery of the gun.24 Additionally, the court found that the
23

Id. at 494, 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183.

23 Id. at 493, 472 N.E.2d at 1010, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
240Id. at

495, 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
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lower court erred, as a matter of law, in finding reasonable
suspicion of criminality. The Court of Appeals stated that the
driver's emergence from his car upon being pulled over by police,
combined with his failure to produce a driver's license were not
indicative of criminality, and therefore, the officers possessed no
justification for their search.24 '
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States, in New
York v. Class,242 reversed the Court of Appeals decision, holding
that the search of Class' vehicle was "constitutionally permissible in
light of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN
and the fact that the officers observed respondent commit two
243
traffic violations."
The Supreme Court, while admitting that there was no reason for
suspecting that Class' vehicle was stolen, or that he had committed
any offenses other than those for which he was pulled over,
reasoned that due to the important role played by the VIN in the
government's regulation of automobiles, as well as the
government's efforts in ensuring that the VIN is placed in plain
view in all vehicles, Class retained no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the VIN. 244 Moreover, the Court stated that the ensuing
"search" for the VIN was constitutionally permissible.
The
majority reasoned that, if Class had remained in his vehicle, the
officers would have been justified in requesting that he remove the
papers covering the VIN.245
Accordingly, because Class
immediately exited his car, and "[i]n light of the danger to the
officers' safety that would have been presented by returning
[defendant] immediately to his car ... the search to obtain the
VIN" was constitutional.246 The court concluded by noting the
overall reasonableness of the search:
The officer did not root about the interior of respondent's
automobile before proceeding to examine the VIN. He did
241Id. at 496, 472 N.E.2d
242 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
243 Id. at 119.

at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 184.

244Id. at
24
1Id.
246

114.
at 115.

Id. at 116.
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not reach into any compartments or open any containers.
He did not even intrude into the interior at all until after he
had checked the door jam for the VIN. When he did
intrude, the officer simply reached directly for the
unprotected space where the VIN was located to remove the
offending
papers.
[Accordingly]...
the
search
24 7
permissible.
constitutionally
was...
On remand, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v.
Class,248 reversed the order of the Supreme Court of the United
States, noting that when the case was first before the court, it was
held that Article I, § 12 of the State Constitution was violated by
the search. In so holding, the state court failed to mention or
address the reasoning of the country's highest court, stating simply,
"we have already held that the State Constitution has been violated,
[and] we should not reach a different result following reversal on
Federal constitutional grounds."249
Once again, the New York Court of Appeals holding in People v.
Class disregarded a ruling by the Supreme Court of the United
States, reprimanded police officers for taking adequate precautions
in protecting the safety of the public at large, and granted criminals
in New York State broader constitutional protections than those
mandated by the United States Constitution.
Michigan v. Long' is a further example of the Court of Appeals'
reluctance to follow the Supreme Court in the area of automobile
searches and seizures. In Long, two police officers observed a
vehicle traveling erratically and at an excessive rate of speed. The
car proceeded to swerve into a ditch and the officers stopped to
investigate. Long exited his vehicle and met the officers at the rear
of his car. The officers later testified that Long appeared to be
under the influence of drugs or alcohol and did not respond to the
officers requests to produce his license and registration. Long
walked towards the open door of his car and the officers followed
247

Id.at 118-19.

67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986).
Id. at 433, 494 N.E.2d at 445, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
250 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986).
24
249

25'463

U.S. 1032 (1983).
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behind him. Upon arriving at the door, the officers observed a
hunting knife on the floorboard of Long's car, stopped him, and
subjected him to a frisk. One of the officers then proceeded to
shine a flashlight into the vehicle and saw an object protruding from
under the armrest. Upon lifting the armrest, the officer found an
open pouch that contained marijuana and Long was arrested.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court upheld the officers' search of
the passenger compartment of the car, stating that such protective
searches during an investigative detention are constitutionally
permissible under the principles articulated in Terry v. Ohio and
other cases." 2 The Court stressed the fact that if the suspect is not
placed under arrest he will be free to reenter his vehicle and will
then have access to any weapons therein. 3
In its opinion in Long, the Supreme Court adopted a framework
for police to follow when conducting searches of individuals
stopped alongside their automobile. The Court held that when an
officer has a reasonable belief,
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be
clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
necessary measures to determine whether the person is in
fact carrying a weapon. 54
The Court went on to note that roadside encounters between
police and suspects are particularly dangerous due to the possible
presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect, and that
when a full custodial arrest has not been made in such a situation,
the officer is forced to make a quick decision as to how to protect
himself and others. 5 Accordingly, the Court upheld the search of
Long's automobile.

2

25

3

21

'
25

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1035.
1052.
1047 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
1052.
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In People v. Torres, 6 the New York Court of Appeals refused to
adopt the approach articulated in Long. Although the facts in
Torres differ from those of Long, the situation which arose during
the encounter between the officer and Torres was quite similar to
that of the officer and Long. In Torres, police received a tip from
an anonymous caller that an individual who was wanted on
homicide charges could be found having his hair cut at a certain
barbershop in Manhattan. The caller described the suspect as a
large, six-foot tall Hispanic male wearing a white sweater, driving a
black Eldorado, and carrying a gun in a shoulder bag.
Two plain clothes detectives arrived at the location and observed
Torres leave the barbershop with another man and enter a black
Eldorado. Torres, who fit the anonymous caller's description, was
wearing a white sweater and carrying a shoulder bag. The officers
approached the vehicle with guns drawn and ordered the occupants
to exit the car and immediately frisked them. While one detective
was still conducting the pat down of Torres, the other reached into
the automobile and took out the shoulder bag from the front seat.
Due to its unusual weight, the officer felt the outside of the bag and
discerned the shape of a gun. The officer unzipped the bag and
discovered a revolver.
Torres pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree after the hearing court denied his motion to suppress.
The trial court held that the anonymous tip, coupled with the
observations of the officers on the scene, was sufficient to justify
the detective's intrusive actions. The decision, however, was
reversed by the New York Court of Appeals.
In Torres, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Supreme
Court's interpretation in Michigan v. Long of Terry v. Ohio, was
inconsistent with the rights guaranteed by the New York State
Constitution; and that
once the detectives had frisked the two men, and had
thereby satisfied themselves that there was no immediate
threat to their safety, there was, as a matter of law, no
justification for conducting a further... search extending
256 74

N.Y.2d 224, 543 N.E.2d 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989).
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to the7 removal of personal effects from the front seat of the
car.

25

Further, the state court mocked the majority of the Supreme
Court, stating:
[i]t is unrealistic to assume, as the Supreme Court did in
Michigan v. Long, that having been stopped and questioned
without incident, a suspect who is about to be released and
permitted to proceed on his way would, upon reentry into
his vehicle, reach for a concealed weapon and threaten the
departing officer's safety. Certainly, such a far fetched
scenario is an insufficient basis upon which to predicate the
substantial intrusion that occurred here. 58
The majority of New York's highest court condemned the police
officers precautionary procedures, stating with sarcasm the
absurdity of a scenario wherein defendant, a murder suspect,
allowed to return to his vehicle, retains his gun and fires upon the
police officer's on the scene.
The fallacy of the majority's perception of the police encounter in
the instant case was addressed by Judge Bellacosa in dissent.
Bellacosa stated:
The finely spun and bifurcated analysis of the majority may
work in the cloister, but it does not work and is not
warranted for the hard streets. The dangers may be "farfetched" to judges in the protected enclave of the
courthouse, but not to cops on the beat.25 9
In fact, the ruling of the majority prohibits the police, on the
beat and in an extremely dangerous encounter with an armed
felon, from completing "their concededly lawful approach and
frisk by unrealistically and unnecessarily curtailing the officer's
authority to reach for and secure the reported weapon to ensure

257Id.

at 227, 543 N.E.2d at 63, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
25' Id. at 230-231.
19 Id. at 232 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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their own contemporaneous safety."2 The precedent developed
in Torres has led to the suppression of incriminating evidence in
numerous cases in New York." 1
In essence, the Torres decision instructs a police officer, who has
removed a murder suspect from his automobile and who has
reasonablesuspicion that such suspect has a deadly weapon in the
passenger compartment of the vehicle, to either arrest the suspect,
or simply allow the individual to return to his car wherein his
weapon remains, and have faith that such an individual will
simply drive away.6 2 The New York Court of Appeals'
decisions in the area of automobile searches and seizures has not
only placed officers who make routine traffic stops in danger, but
has also caused incriminating evidence, to be suppressed. In a
situation where an officer stops a car based upon reasonable
suspicion and then, based upon his training and experience
suspects that criminal activity may be afoot, the New York Court
of Appeals has greatly undermined the ability of the officer to
investigate the situation and dispel any possible danger. The

imposition of such rigorous standards to protect the right of New
York drivers and their passengers has meant that ultimately

Id.
See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 199 A.D.2d 1043, 606 N.Y.S.2d 484 (4th
Dep't 1993); People v. Mullins, 196 A.D.2d 894, 602 N.Y.S.2d 156 (2nd
Dep't 1993); People v. Snyder, 178 A.D.2d 757, 577 N.Y.S.2d 678 (3d Dep't
1991); People v. Pena, 155 A.D.2d 310, 547 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1st Dep't 1989);
People v. Theodis, 155 A.D.2d 339, 547 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep't 1989).
262 Two recent decisions by the Court in the area of automobile stops also
highlights the Supreme Court's trend in expanding law enforcement's ability to
conduct more expansive road side stops, searches, and seizures. In Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Court upheld the stop of a car by a
police officer based upon pre-text. The holding in Whren has not been
acknowledged by the Court of Appeals as of yet; however, lower courts in
New York have held that a traffic violation may not be utilized as a pre-text to
investigate an individual on an unrelated matter. Additionally, the Court in
Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct 882 (1997), held that an officer who makes a
traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending investigation.
Taken in conjunction, the two recent Supreme Court cases have the practical
effect of permitting officers to stop any car violating any traffic law and order
the driver and passengers out of the car under the pre-text of conducting a
further investigation.
261

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

59

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1998], Art. 10

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 14

criminal activity goes undetected or criminals are released by
judges who are compelled to suppress the incriminating evidence
due to the precedent established by the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of Article I, § 12 of the New York State
Constitution.
V. SEARCHES WITHIN THE HOME

The following set of cases clearly indicate the divergence between
the United States Supreme Court and the New York Court of
Appeals' with respect to what types of searches of the home are
constitutionally protected. Payton v. New York 63 and New York v.
Harris264 demonstrate how the New York Court of Appeals
declined to follow the precedent established by the highest court in
the land. Instead, the Court of Appeals has extended greater rights
than those afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. This area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence also
illustrates how in recent years the Supreme Court has further
restricted the rights of criminal defendants while in direct contrast,
the New York Court of Appeals has enlarged their rights.
In 1978, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Payton2 65
affirmed the conviction of two defendants after the police made a
warrantless entry into their home and discovered incriminating
2 66
evidence in plain-view. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that a warrantless,
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make a routine felony
arrest, violates the Fourth Amendment.267 The Court's 1980
decision was written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist dissented. Ten years
later, in New York v. Harris,26 the Supreme Court refused to
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
26' 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
26 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978).
263

266 439 U.S. 1044 (1980).
267
26'

Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.
495 U.S. 14 (1990).
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expand the rule developed in Payton and held that the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule does not bar the prosecution from
using a statement made by a suspect at a police station after the
police entered the suspect's home and arrested him without a
warrant. Ten years of Republican administrations have altered the
composition of the Supreme Court. The opinion in Harris,
demonstrated the power of the Court's new conservative alignment.
The Court's opinion was authored by Justice White and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy. The dissent was authored by Justice Marshall and joined
by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens.
When Harris was remanded, the New York Court of Appeals
held on independent state grounds, that the "Supreme Court rule
does not adequately protect the search and seizure rights of citizens
of New York."
This, only ten years after holding that a
warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make a
routine felony arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
New York Court of Appeals held that the "State Constitution
requires that statements obtained from an accused following a
Payton violation must be suppressed .... "269
The decision in Payton combined two different cases* ° with
similar facts and the identical legal issue. In the first fact scenario,
the police suspected Theodore Payton of murdering the manager of
a gas station during the commission of an armed robbery." Two
days later, two eyewitnesses to the homicide came forward and
identified Payton as the killer. Additionally, one of the witnesses
gave the police Payton's address. Thereafter, the police went to

People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053, 568
N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (1991). Justice Stevens was particularly pleased with the
Court of Appeals decision, writing to Justice Marshall, "[i]n view of your
characteristically excellent dissent in New York v. Harris, I think you might
enjoy the opinion of the Court of Appeals on remand." See Marshall Papers,
dated February 22, 1991, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
270 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Riddick v. New York, 445
U.S. 573 (1980).
269

271

People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 380 N.E.2d 224, 226, 408

N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (1978)
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Payton's home to make an arrest. 72 The police did not secure a
warrant as warrantless and forcible entry was authorized by §177 of
the New York Code of Criminal Procedure which stated, "A peace
officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person ...

[w]hen a felony

has been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the
person to be arrested to have committed it." 273 Section 178 of the
code stated that, "To make an arrest, as provided in the last
section, the officer may break open an outer or inner door or
window of a building, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he
be refused admittance."2 7 4 In Payton, the police knocked on the
door, but there was no response. After noticing that there were
lights and music on in the apartment, the police, approximately 30
minutes later, used a crowbar to break open the door and enter the
apartment. 271 The apartment was unoccupied and the police found,
in plain view, a .30 caliber shell casing that was seized and later
used in the successful murder prosecution of Payton. 76
Similarly, the second of the consolidated cases involved a
warrantless arrest for a felony. The police suspected Obie Riddick
was the perpetrator of two armed robberies, after he had been
identified by the victims. 2 n After learning Riddick's address, the
police went to arrest him, without first obtaining an arrest warrant.
Although the New York Code of Criminal Procedure had been
revised by the recently adopted New York Criminal Procedure
Law, section 140.15(4) of the revised law, still permitted the police
to arrest a defendant in his home without a warrant under certain
circumstances. Pursuant to the new statute, the police went to
Riddick's home and knocked on the door.27 Riddick's young son
opened the door permitting the officers to enter where they found
Riddick in bed. Riddick was placed under arrest. The police
searched Riddick's drawers located two feet from the bed for
weapons. No weapons were recovered but narcotics and other drug
272

273
274
275

Id.
N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 177 (McKinney 1993).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 178 (McKinney 1993).
Id at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397.

276 Id. at

306, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397.

277 Id. at 307, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
278

Id. at 307, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
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paraphernalia were found. 279 Riddick was thereafter indicted on
narcotics charges while his suppression motion was denied."3
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions and
held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police to secure a
warrant when they enter a suspect's home, with probable cause, in
order to make a routine felony arrest.2' Specifically, the court held
that:
[A]n entry made for the purpose of effecting a felony arrest
within the home of the person to be arrested by a police
officer who has entered without permission of the owner, if
based on probable cause, is not necessarily violative of the
constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures even though the arresting officer has
not obtained a warrant and there are no exigent
circumstances.'

The Court of Appeals based its decision on the perceived
difference between a search of the home and entering the home for
the purpose of arresting an individual for a felony.28 The court
stated that there was:
no sufficient reason for distinguishing between an arrest in
a public place and an arrest in a residence. To the extent
that an arrest will always be distasteful or offensive, there
is little reason to assume that arrest within the home is any
more so than arrest in a public place; on the contrary, it
may well be that because of the added exposure the latter
may be more objectionable.2"
The court also based its decision on the historical acceptance of
warrantless arrests in an individual's home and the statutory
279

id.

210 Id.

at 307-08, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
n' Id. at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 225, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
2Id.

m See Payton, 45 N.Y.2d at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 228-29, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
399.
2 Id. at 310-311, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
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authority in the Code of Criminal Procedure.285 Finally, the court
went on to add that, despite other federal courts reaching an
opposite ruling concerning this issue, "[absent] an explicit
determination by the Supreme Court which would permit us no
alternative, we hold that the entries made by the police in the cases
before us did not violate defendants' constitutional protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures." 286

The New York

Court of Appeals in 1978 obviously interpreted the New York State
Constitution dramatically differently than the same Court in the
1980's and 90's.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of
Appeals and based its decision on an interpretation of the history of
the Fourth Amendment. 287 The Supreme Court overruled the Court
of Appeals and reversed the convictions of Payton and Riddick,
holding that the warrantless, nonconsensual entry into their homes
by the police to make a routine felony arrest was in violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights.
In 1989, the court confronted the issue of whether a defendant's
confession should be suppressed after the police, without a warrant,
arrested the defendant for a felony in his home and brought him to
the police precinct where he gave an incriminating statement. The
same court that had ruled, ten years earlier, that the police did not
even need a warrant to arrest an individual in his home, held in
People v. Harris,288 that the confession should be suppressed as it
was the result of an arrest, without a warrant, that violated the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
Bernard Harris murdered his ex-girlfriend by stabbing her to
death.289 The police found the victim's dead body on January 11,
1984, and shortly thereafter developed probable cause to believe
that Harris was the murderer. Five days after the murder, the
police went to Harris' apartment to arrest him. The police,

28

Id. at 311, 380 N.E.2d at 229-30, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01.

26

1 Id. at 312, 380 N.E.2d at 230, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 401.

287

See Payton, 445 U.S. at 583-98.

2"8 72 N.Y.2d 614, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1988).
28 9
Id. at 616, 532 N.E.2d at 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 1.
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however, did not have a warrant. 290 After knocking on the door a
number of times, Harris finally answered the door and permitted
the officers to enter his apartment?2' Harris stated that he was glad
the police had come for him, and was read his Miranda rights.
Harris acknowledged that he understood his rights, and proceeded
to pour himself a glass of wine. Thereafter, Harris admitted that he
had killed his ex-girlfriend with a knife. "He was arrested, taken
to the station house where he was again given Miranda warnings,
and made [a] written inculpatory statement. ....2

After writing

the statement, Harris proceeded to give a full statement on
videotape admitting that he murdered his ex-girlfriend.'
Before
giving the videotaped statement, Harris stated, "well I really don't
know what to say right now... Ihave said all I can say."Z9 Prior
to trial, a hearing was held to determine the admissibility of all
three statements given by Harris. The trial court suppressed the
statement made in Harris' home as the product of an arrest that was
made in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 2' The court
also suppressed the videotaped statement finding that Harris had
invoked his right to remain silent. 296 The court, however, denied
Harris' motion to dismiss the written statement given at the precinct
because it was given after Miranda warnings and with a waiver of
his rights. 29 At Harris' trial, the prosecution's case-in-chief,
elicited the confession which was given at the police station
approximately one hour after he had been arrested at his home
without a warrant. 29 Harris was convicted after a bench trial and
the verdict was affirmed by a divided appellate division.m The
New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Payton. The Court of Appeals
2q Id. at 617, 532 N.E.2d at 1230, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
2 Id.
mgId.
Id.

793

2Id.
295 Id.

296 Id.

2Id.
298
Id.

9People v. Harris, 124 A.D.2d 472, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1986).
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analyzed the Payton decision, stating that Payton, "held that the
fruits of illegal entries must be suppressed even though the police
might have probable cause to conduct a search or effectuate an
arrest outside the home without a warrant. Under the rule of
Payton, this arrest was clearly illegal ....
In order for the
Court of Appeals to determine what, if any, evidence should be
suppressed as a result of the police violating Harris' Fourth
Amendment rights, the appeals court analyzed the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine enunciated in Wong Sun v. United
States,301 and refined in Brown v. Illinois.3°
The Court in Brown explicitly rejected a requirement that would
suppress all statements made after the police violate a defendant's
constitutional rights. In order to determine whether suppression is
warranted, the Court held that three factors must be considered; the
temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of
intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct.
The Court of Appeals in Harris examined each of the three
factors outlined in Brown. The Court of Appeals found that Harris'
statement was taken only one hour after he had been illegally
arrested, 30 3 and thus "[could not] serve to attenuate the
illegality ....

"'04

Moving to the second factor, the Court of

Appeals found that there was no intervening factor to warrant the
attenuation of the Fourth Amendment violation and the
incriminating statement. 5 Finally, the appeals court examined the
flagrancy of the official misconduct. The court found that the
police made no attempt to obtain a warrant and thus the "police
illegality was knowing and intentional. .

.. "

Despite the

Supreme Court's statement in Payton that the holding was derived
from the "overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has
been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the
3o0

Harris,72 N.Y.2d at 619, 532 N.E.2d at 1231, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 3-4.

301 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
302 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
303

Harris,72 N.Y.2d at 621, 532 N.E.2d at 1232, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5.

304 Id. at 621, 532 N.E. at 1233, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
305 Id.
306

Id. at 622, 532 N.E.2d at 1233, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
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Republic,"3 10 the Court of Appeals stated that other courts were
incorrect in their belief that the "wrong in Payton cases... lies not

in the arrest, but in the unlawful entry into a dwelling without
proper judicial authorization."3 03 Based upon these findings, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the incriminating statement
was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest, and thus
reversed the appellate division, suppressing the incriminating
statements made by Harris at the police precinct.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the statements made by Harris were in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. 3 9 The Supreme Court's decision was
written by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. The Court held that the
exclusionary rule did not bar the statements made by Harris to the
police at the precinct even though the police had entered his home
without a warrant or consent.
The Court analyzed its decision in Payton and the rationale of the
New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court disagreed with
the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals that the wrong in
Payton lies with the arrest. The Supreme Court held in Harristhat:
[w]e decline to apply the exclusionary rule in this context
because the rule in Payton was designed to protect the
physical integrity of the home; it was not intended to grant
criminal suspects, like Harris, protection for statements
made outside their premises where the police have probable
cause to arrest the suspect for committing a crime." '
The Court added that nothing in Payton "suggests that an arrest in a
home without a warrant but with probable cause somehow renders
unlawful continued custody of the suspect once he is removed from
the house."3" Logically, therefore, the police were not required to
release Harris and thus Harris had no valid claim that an illegal
307 Payton, 445 U.S. at 601.
301Harris, 72 N.Y.2d at 623,

532 N.E.2d at 1234, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 6.

490 U.S. 1018 (1989).
People v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990).
311Id. at 18.
3

30
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search and seizure occurred. Therefore, when Harris was taken to
the precinct, read his rights, and given the opportunity to speak, the
Court found that he was lawfully in custody.3" 2 The Court
concluded that:
[t]he station house statement in this case was admissible
because Harris was in legal custody ...

and because the

statement, while the product of an arrest and being in
custody, was not the fruit of the fact that the arrest was
made in the house rather than someplace else.313
The Court went on to explain further that:
[s]uppressing the statement taken outside the house would
not serve the purpose of the rule that made Harris' in-house
arrest illegal. The warrant requirement for an arrest in the
house is imposed to protect the home, and anything
incriminating the police gathered from arresting Harris in
his home, rather than elsewhere, has been excluded, as it
should have been; the purpose of the rule has thereby been
vindicated.314
The Court, reversing the judgment of the New York Court of
Appeals, refused to go further than the Constitutional requirements
of the Fourth Amendment and suppress statements made by Harris
in an effort to deter police from violating Payton.
The Court of Appeals subsequently disregarded the Court's
decision in Harris and held that State constitutional provisions that
prohibit searches and seizures require suppression when an
individual is arrested at home without a warrant and later confesses
at the police station.315 It is extraordinary that only ten years earlier
the New York Court of Appeals held that it was unnecessary for the
police to obtain a warrant to arrest an individual for a felony in
their home. The court held that not only is a warrant required to
312

id.

313

Id. at 20.

314

Id.

311

People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702

(1991).
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make a felony arrest in an individual's home,3'16 but if such an arrest
is made without a warrant, regardless of the existence of probable
cause, a statement given by the defendant must be suppressed
unless it is demonstrated that the statement was sufficiently
attenuated from the Payton wrong. The decision in Harrishas led
to the suppression of numerous confessions."
The New York Court of Appeals asserted that the "Supreme
Court's rule does not adequately protect the search and seizure right
'
The Court of Appeals based its
of citizens of New York."318
decision on their interpretation of Article I, §12 of The New York
State Constitution. Although the court acknowledged that both
Article I, § 12 and the Fourth Amendment were identical and that it
is desirable to interpret them consistently, the court, without
justification concluded that a "State court may adopt a different
construction of a similar State provision unconstrained by a
contrary Supreme Court interpretation of the Federal
counterpart. " 9 While states may legitimately grant greater rights,
one would expect the Court of Appeals to illustrate a principled
basis for such departure from the ruling of the highest court of the
United States.
VI. SEARCHES OF COMMERCIAL PREMISES
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures has been held to apply to commercial
premises as well as to private homes. 32° Thus, an owner or
operator of a business has a reasonable expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize under Fourth Amendment analysis.
This expectation of privacy, however, is less than the privacy
36 This position of the Court is clearly antithetical to their 1978 decision in
Payton.
317 See, e.g., People v. Byas, 172 A.D.2d 242, 568 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1st Dep't
1991); People v. Medina, 161 Misc. 2d 484, 615 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1994).
318 Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 437, 570 N.E.2d at 1052-53, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 70304.31
9 Id. at 437-38, 570 N.E.2d at 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
31 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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afforded to an individual's home. The Supreme Court has held, in
addition, that the expectation of privacy in "closely regulated"
industries is even less than that of typical commercial premises.
The "closely regulated" analysis developed from two cases which
involved a "long tradition of close government supervision." 32' In
Colonnade Corp. v. United States,3 the Court upheld a warrantless
search of catering businesses pursuant to a federal revenue statute
authorizing the inspection of the premises of liquor dealers. In
United States v. Biswell,3'2 the Court upheld the warrantless
inspection of a pawn shop operator who was federally licensed to
sell weapons. Thus, the application of the Colonnade-Biswell
holdings find that "closely regulated" businesses have a reduced
expectation of privacy, and therefore, probable cause and warrant
requirements of the Fourth Amendment are less stringent than
normal.
In a later application of these holdings, the Court in Donovan v.
Dewey324 set forth three criteria that must be met before the

warrantless inspection of a "closely regulated" business is found to
be reasonable. First, there must be a "substantial" government
interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the
inspection is made. 3 5 Second, the warrantless inspection must be
"necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme., 326 Third, "the
statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity
of its application, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate
327
substitute for a warrant."
In New York v. Burger,328 the Court was confronted with the
constitutionality of a New York statutory provision that permitted
the warrantless search of an automobile junkyard in order to deter
criminal behavior. In Burger, five officers entered Burger's
See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
32297 U.S. 72 (1970).
313406 U.S. 311 (1972).
324 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
321
Id. at 602.
326
321

Id. at 600.

327

Id. at 603.

32' 482

U.S. 691 (1987).
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junkyard to conduct an inspection pursuant to a statute authorizing
the search of such premises. 3' The VIN numbers of vehicles and
parts thereof were copied down by the officers. 330 Thereafter, the
police checked those numbers against a police computer and
determined that Burger was in possession of stolen vehicles and
parts. Burger was arrested and charged with five counts of
possession of stolen property. At the trial court, Burger moved to
suppress the evidence on the basis that the statutory provision
permitting these administrative inspections was unconstitutional.
The trial court denied Burger's motion. The New York Court of
Appeals reversed, and held that § 415-a5 violated the Fourth's
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 331 The Court of Appeals held that because the statutory
provisions sole purpose is to undercover evidence of criminality, a
search warrant is necessary. 332 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari,"33 and held in a 6-3 decision, authored by Justice
Blackmun, that § 415-a5 satisfies the "three criteria necessary" for
closely regulated warrantless searches.3 34 The Court found that
"the State has a substantial interest in regulating the vehicledismantling and automobile-junkyard industry because motor
vehicle theft has increased in the State and because the problem of

3 Id. at 693.; N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAw § 415-aS (Mcimnney 1986). This
provision provides in pertinent part:
Upon request of an agent of the commissioner or of any
police officer... a vehicle dismantler shall produce such
records and permit said agent or police officer to examine
them and any vehicles or parts of vehicles which are subject
to the record keeping requirements of this section and which
are on the premises .... The failure to produce such
records or to permit such inspection on the part of any person
required to be registered pursuant to this section as required
by this paragraph shall be a class A misdemeanor.
Id.3
3 Burger, 482 U.S. at 695.
331 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986).
332 Id. at 344, 493 N.E.2d at 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 705.

333 479 U.S. 812 (1986).
31 Burger, 482 U.S. at 708.
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theft is associated with this industry." 33 5 Additionally, the Court

found that "regulation of the vehicle-dismantling industry
reasonably serves the State's substantial interest in eradicating
automobile theft."336 Finally, the Court held that the "time, place,
and scope of the inspection is limited to place appropriate restraints
upon the discretion of the inspecting officers."3 37 Addressing the

Court of Appeals finding that the statute was unconstitutional
because it was "designed simply to give the police an expedient
means of enforcing penal sanctions for possession of stolen
property,, 338 the Court held that the Court of Appeals, "failed to
recognize that a State can address a major social problem both by
339
way of administrative scheme and through penal sanctions."
The New York Court of Appeals, however, refused to uphold the
legitimacy of § 415-a5. In People v. Keta,340 the court, per Judge
Titone, stated that despite the Court's ruling in Burger "we consistent with the well-settled principles of federalism - are not
bound by decisions of the Supreme Court construing similar
provisions of the Federal Constitution. "341 The Court went on to
add that:
[o]ur firm and continuing commitment to protecting the
privacy rights embodied within article I, § 12 of our State
Constitution leads us to the conclusion that Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 415-a5(a)'s provisions for warrantless,
suspicionless searches of business premises cannot
withstand challenge under our State Constitution.342
Therefore, despite the Supreme Court's holding in Burger the Court
of Appeals found it necessary to enhance the rights of New York
citizens under the State Constitution, by striking down the statutory
provision permitting warrantless searches of junkyard businesses.
335Id.
336 Id.

at 709.

337 Id. at 711 (citation omitted).
338

Burger, 67 N.Y.2d at 344, 493 N.E.2d at 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 705.

339 Burger, 482 U.S. at 712.

"0 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
34' Id. at 495-96, 593 N.E.2d at 1341, 583 N.Y.2d at 933.
342 Id. at 497, 593 N.E.2d at 1342, 583 N.Y.S.2d
at 934.
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The Court of Appeals failed to address how the decision affected
the rights of those individuals whose automobiles are stripped or
stolen. However, the Court did state that it was not their
responsibility "to shape the law so as to advance the goals of law
enforcement, but rather to stand as a fixed citadel for constitutional
rights, safeguarding them against those who would dismantle our
system of ordered liberty in favor of a system of well-kept order
alone." 343
The decision in Burger has dramatically limited the ability of law
enforcement officers and prosecutors to monitor criminal activity in
the automotive industry. It is highly likely that many criminal
enterprises run by organized crime will go undetected. Businesses
involved in automotive criminal activity now have the opportunity
to sell car parts as well as register false insurance claims without
concern of being subjected to a non-warrant investigatory check by
the police.
VII. THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
Once a court finds that the Fourth Amendment has been violated,
a determination must be made as to whether the seized evidence
should be suppressed. As early as 1914, the United States Supreme
Court applied the judicially created exclusionary rule to bar
evidence obtained as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation?"
The exclusionary rule was created in an effort to deter violations of
the Fourth Amendment. 345 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied
in every instance where the Fourth Amendment has been
violated. 6 A significant exception to the Fourth Amendment's
3 Id.

at 501, 593 N.E.2d at 1345, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
1 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that evidence
seized from defendant's home by federal officers without a search warrant was
suppressed under the exclusionary rule). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule through the Fourteenth
Amendment is applicable to the States).
11 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
346 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that a state
prisoner who has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth
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exclusionary rule was promulgated in United States v. Leon.347 The
Court held that the exclusionary rule does not bar the use of
evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but
ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. The goodfaith exception was welcomed by law enforcement agencies across
the United States. However, the New York Court of Appeals, in
People v. Bigelow,34 declined to apply the exclusionary rule
exception.
In Leon, the Supreme Court confronted the highly anticipated
issue of whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule,
"should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's
case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable
cause." 34 9 In Leon an informant whose credibility was unknown,
informed the local police that two persons were "selling cocaine
and methaqualone from their residence., 35
In addition, the
informant told the police that the persons were known to him as
"Armando" and "Patsy" and lived at 620 Price Drive, Burbank,
California. 351 The informant also told the police that he had
personally witnessed the sale of methaqualone by Patsy several
months prior at her residence. Moreover, the informant told the
police that "Armando" and "Patsy" had only a small amount of
drugs in their home, but stored larger amounts at another location.
As a result of this information, the police began to investigate.

Amendment claim may not obtain federal habeas relief on the ground that
unlawfully obtained evidence had been introduced at trial); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that grand jury witnesses may not
refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment); United State v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that
evidence illegally seized by state officials could be used in federal civil

proceedings).
117468 U.S. 897 (1984).
348 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985).
149 Leon, 468 U.S. at 900.
350 Id. at 901.
351 Id.
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After surveillance of the Price Drive residence, it was determined
that Armando Sanchez, Patsy Stewart, and Ricardo Del Castillo
often parked their cars outside this residence. Both Sanchez and
Del Castillo had prior drug charges. On one occasion, police
watched Del Castillo arrive at the Price Drive residence, enter the
house, and exit shortly thereafter with a small paper sack.35 The
police checked Del Castillo's probation records and found Alberto
Leon's name as his employer. It was discovered that Leon had
been arrested in 1980 for a drug charge. Additionally, a
companion of Leon's at the time, "informed the police that Leon
was heavily involved in the importation of drugs into the United
States."" 3 Moreover, a different informant had previously
informed the police that Leon stored a large quantity of
methaqualone at his residence. With this information, the police
applied for a warrant to search, among other sights, the home at
620 Price Drive and Leon's home. 35
The search warrant was approved by a State Superior Court
Judge and the search produced quantities of drugs at both
residences. After his indictment, Leon filed a motion to suppress
the evidence based upon an insufficient warrant. The District Court
concluded, after a hearing, that the affidavit for the search warrant
lacked probable cause. The District Court, however, found that the
officer who prepared the warrant acted in reasonable good faith. 355
Despite this finding, the District Court denied the government's
suggestion that the exclusionary rule should not apply where a
police officer acts in reasonable reliance upon a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District
Court's finding and held that the affidavit was insufficient.35 6 A
divided Ninth Circuit found that the basis of knowledge and
veracity of the informant prongs were not met, and accordingly
affirmed the suppression of the evidence under both prongs of the
two-part test established in Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United
352

Id.

353 id.

354 Id. at
355

902.
Id. at 904.

356

Id.
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States. 3 7 The Ninth Circuit declined to adopt the government's

position of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The
Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari on
behalf of the United States but did not contest the Ninth Circuit's
finding that the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause,
even though they could have argued that proposition under the
Gates, "totality of the circumstances" test. The Government's
position was that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
should be adopted.
The Court granted certiorari to consider the exception to the
exclusionary rule, 358 the Court found that, "[a~lthough it
undoubtedly is within our power to consider the question whether
probable cause existed under the 'totality of the circumstances' test
announced last term in Illinois v. Gates, that question has not been
briefed or argued .... ..
Justice White, writing for the Court's
majority concluded that a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, where a police officer acts in reasonable reliance upon an
executed search warrant, should be adopted. The Court stated that,
"the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the

...
See supra notes 168-197 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note
that Justice Anthony Kennedy, who was on the Ninth Circuit, joined the
dissenters in the Leon opinion. See United States v. Leon, No. 82-1093 (9th
Cir. Jan, 19, 1983) (unpublished). A number of press accounts have
mischaracterized Kennedy's dissent in Leon. See, e.g., Al Karmen and Ruth
Marcus, "Record Contrasts With Bork's; Kennedy Appears Less Ideologically
Driven," The Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1987, at Al (stating, in a front page
article,

that

Kennedy's

"staunch

law

and

order

credentials... are

demonstrated by his dissent in a 1983 case involving the Exclusionary
Rule ....
Kennedy urged that judge allow such evidence to be used if the
police act in 'good faith."'). It should be made clear that Justice Kennedy did
not create, or even endorse, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
in his dissent in Leon. In his dissent, Justice Kennedy did not find it necessary
to discuss any exception to the exclusionary rule because he found the search
warrant in question to be valid under the Fourth Amendment.
358 463 U.S. 1206 (1983).
311 United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (citation omitted).
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substantial costs of exclusion. " 360 Thus, the rationale for the
Court's new exception to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary
rule was that suppressing evidence, seized by police in objective
good faith reliance on a warrant mistakenly issued by a judge, did
not deter police misconduct.
The Court's decision drew a sharp dissent from Justices Brennan
and Marshall. Justice Brennan wrote that:
[i]t now appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth
Amendment is complete. That today's decisions represent
the piece de resistance of the Court's past efforts cannot be
doubted, for today the Court sanctions the use in the
prosecution's case-in-chief of illegally obtained evidence
against the individual whose rights have been violated - a
result that had previously been thought to be foreclosed .36
In 1985, the Court of Appeals in People v. BigelowPv- refused to
adopt the good faith exception. The court in one sentence
concluded that, "[v]e therefore decline, on State constitutional
In Bigelow,
grounds, to apply the good-faith exception .... ,
police were informed that Bigelow "telegraphed almost $25,000 to
a Florida resident over a four-month period." 3" The residence
where the money was wired was known as a high-drug area.3 In
addition, Bigelow had two different post-office boxes in two
different cities in New York where he received a total of three
packages from Florida.366 Moreover, the police knew that Bigelow
frequently visited an apartment that was occupied by an individual
who was a known drug user and dealer. The police observed
Bigelow at a post office box retrieve a package from Florida.
Bigelow then proceeded directly to the apartment of the known
The police spoke with an informant, while
drug dealer.3
at 922.
361 Id. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985).
3 Id.
at 427, 488 N.E.2d at 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
3°Id.

361 Id.

at 421, 488 N.E.2d at 453, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 633.

365 Id. at
3

421, 488 N.E.2d at 454, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 633.

66 Id.

367Id.
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maintaining surveillance of the apartment. The informant told the
officers that Bigelow was:
a drugger who had arrived in the Arcade area from Florida
during the Summer of 1981, that he had no job but plenty
of money, that he was dealing in cocaine shipped from
Florida and that he had a close relative in Florida. The
informant told the police that the defendant had conducted
drug transactions as recently as 'Christmas week of
1981.'3"
Shortly thereafter, the police obtained a search warrant from a local
County Judge. After Bigelow left the drug dealer's apartment, the
officers pulled over his car. 69 Bigelow was frisked and read his
Miranda rights. He was then taken to the police station and his
automobile was impounded and searched pursuant to the search
warrant.37 ° The police found amphetamines, hypodermic needles
and over $4,500 in cash. 371 Bigelow was formally arrested.
Bigelow filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial
court. Thereafter, Bigelow pleaded guilty. Bigelow appealed the
trial court's decision on the ground that the search warrant was not
supported by probable cause. The People asserted that the warrant
was supported by probable cause under the Aguilar-Spinelli two
prong test. Alternatively, the People argued that the search warrant
was supported by probable cause under the Supreme Court's
recently adopted "totality of the circumstances" test enunciated in
Illinois v. Gates.3 72 Finally, the People argued that even if the
search warrant lacked probable cause under both the two prong and
"totality of the circumstances" tests, the police acted in objective
good faith when executing the warrant, and therefore, the Supreme
Court's good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.
The New York Court of Appeals found that the search warrant
lacked probable cause under both rationales and held that
36S
Id.
369
Id. at 422, 488 N.E.2d at 454, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
370 Id.
371Id.
372462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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"exclusion cannot be avoided because, as a matter of State
constitutional law, we decline to apply the Leon good-faith
standard."Mr Not only did the Court of Appeals decline to adopt
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court of
Appeals also refused to adopt the "totality of the circumstances"
test when determining probable cause. The court found that, "New
York's present law applies the Aguilar-Spinelli rule for evaluating
secondhand information and holds that if probable cause is based on
hearsay statements, the police must establish that the informant had
some basis for the knowledge he transmitted to them and that he
was reliable. " 374 The court found that the People failed to satisfy
the "basis of knowledge" prong of the test because the informant's
information did not sufficiently describe Bigelow's activities. 3'
After finding that the search warrant lacked probable cause, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the People's contention that the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply. The Court of
Appeals disagreed with the Supreme Court's underlying rationale
that police misconduct cannot be deterred where the police act in
objective good faith reliance on a warrant issued by a judge that is
later deemed to lack probable cause. The court argued that:
[I]f the People are permitted to use the seized evidence, the
exclusionary rule's purpose is completely frustrated, a
premium is placed on the illegal police action and a positive
incentive is provided to others to engage in similar lawless
acts in the future.376
The Court of Appeals summarily decided that adoption of the good
faith exception would add a "positive incentive ... to others to

engage in similar lawless acts in the future." 377 This line of
reasoning is inconsistent when the good faith exception applies only
where the police act in objective good faith. As the Supreme Court

373 66 N.Y.2d at 422, 488 N.E.2d at 455, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
374 Id. at 423,
375 Id. at 424,
376 Id.
3

488 N.E.2d at 455, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 634 (citations omitted).
488 N.E.2d at 455, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
at 427, 488 N.E.2d at 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (citation omitted).

Id.
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stated in Stone v. Powell,378 where a police officer's conduct is

objectively reasonable,
excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully
apparent that... the officer is acting as a reasonable
officer would and should act in similar circumstances.
Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future
conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his
duty

379

When a police officer acts in objective good faith that a search
warrant is properly prepared and has probable cause, there is
nothing to deter.
CONCLUSION
Although Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution are
identical, this article has demonstrated that both sections have
been interpreted dramatically different by the New York Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. The Court of
Appeals, basing their decisions on "independent state grounds,"
has consistently interpreted the search and seizure area of
criminal procedure in a manner that hinders the likelihood that
criminal will be caught, and furthermore undermines the prospect
of successful prosecution. The Court of Appeals has broadened
what constitutes a search or seizure before Article I, § 12
protections are triggered. It has declined to adopt the totality of
the circumstance's test when discerning when a search warrant
has probable cause. It has made it more difficult for law
enforcement officials to obtain a search warrant for materials
presumptively protected by the First Amendment. It has made
the area of automobile searches and seizures a complex web of
ambiguous rules and regulations which ultimately has led to a
decreased ability to undercover ongoing criminal activity. It has
378

428 U.S. 465 (1983).

179

Id. at 539-40 (White, J., dissenting).
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decreased the likelihood that police will obtain a permissible
statement from a suspect who is arrested in his home. It has
made it more difficult to search closely regulated businesses such
as junkyards that sell stolen automobiles. Finally, it has declined
to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. While
the New York Court of Appeals continues to maintain that its
actions protect all New Yorkers, their recent decisions mean that
New York police officers, detectives, investigators, and
prosecutors perform their law enforcement obligations under a set
of complex rules antithetical to the United States Government that
undoubtedly decrease the prospect criminals will be caught and
successfully prosecuted.
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